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PART I: TITLE PROTECTION AND USE IN THE MOTION PICTURE
AND TELEVISION INDUSTRIES-THE NATURE OF THE
PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
If an entertainment producer wants a specific title for his produc-
tion, and wants to avoid a lawsuit over that title, an awareness of the
melange of statutory and common law which can loosely be referred to
as "title law" is essential. Title law attempts to balance the legitimate
interests of those who claim some sort of exclusive rights to a literary
title or name against the equally legitimate needs of those who must have
titles and names for their works and products. The pool of potential
plaintiffs includes authors of books, periodicals, television series, newspa-
pers, plays, and musical recordings. Also included are those in the com-
mercial arena who name products or invent advertising slogans for their
products. Understanding how titles acquire protected status may help
producers and others involved in naming entertainment productions to
avoid litigation.
II. SOURCES OF LAW APPLICABLE TO TITLE PROTECTION AND USE
No single body of law exists which an author or owner of a "single
literary title" can look to for title protection. The term "single literary
title" refers to the title of a one-time, non-serial work, as opposed to a
television series or a periodical publication.' Copyright law is available
for titles of series works2 and gives an author of a work the exclusive
privilege to the publication, production, or sale of that literary, musical
or artistic work for certain express periods of time.' Copyright law is not
available for single literary titles. Although regulations promulgated by
the Copyright Office clearly state that "words and short phrases such as
names, titles, and slogans" are not subject to federal copyright protec-
tion,4 there does not appear to be any statutory or constitutional reason
for the prohibition.5 Reinforcing these regulations, American courts
have uniformly held that the title of a single literary work cannot be
1. Perry, Protecting Literary Titles, 12 NEW MATTER 1 (1987) [hereinafter Perry]. The
title of a book which is not a single, one-shot work, but is the title of a book series, such as
"The Hardy Boys," would not be considered a "single literary title."
2. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1989); Copyright Office Regulation 202.1(a) (1989); Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure, §§ 1301.09, 1301.10.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (5th ed. 1979).
4. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1989).
5. 1 J. T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:9, at 352 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
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protected by either statutory copyright law,6 or state common law
copyright.7
Subject to certain conditions, however, protection against unauthor-
ized use of an author's title can be obtained under different forms of the
common law doctrine of unfair competition.' At the federal level, this
protection is embodied in the federal trademark statute known as the
Lanham Act;9 at the state level, the protection takes the form of common
law unfair competition doctrines and anti-dilution statutes.
An examination of the case law discloses that a majority of title in-
fringement cases are tried in either California or New York, the en-
tertainment capitals of the United States.'° Additionally, an analysis of
decisions in California and New York discloses a dichotomy in the atti-
tudes toward the legal protection currently available for literary titles."
This article focuses on the current state of the law, distinctions between
jurisdictions, and causes of action available in California, New York and
their corresponding federal circuits.
A. State Unfair Competition Law
The foundation of title protection law is the theory of unfair compe-
tition. The unfair competition action began as an English common law
doctrine developed by the English Courts of Merchant in the early
1700's.12 The doctrine sought to correct acts of unfairness, dishonesty,
misrepresentation, and passing or palming off'3 (the use of another's rep-
utation to sell one's own goods). 4 Today, the unfair competition action
consists of two theories upon which relief may be granted-passing off
and misappropriation.
Passing off is defined as "making a false representation to a third
party which is likely to induce that person to believe the defendant's
6. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:10, at 352; Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the
Entertainment Industry, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 279, 307 n.153 (1979) [hereinafter Angel]
("Cases since 1909 have been unanimous in their denial of statutory copyright protection for
titles.").
7. Angel, supra note 6, at 308 & n.157.
8. Anthony & Finkelstein, Protecting Against Unauthorized Use of Song Titles As Motion
Picture Titles, 82 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 145 (1984) [hereinafter Anthony & Finkelstein].
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1053-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1989).
10. Angel, supra note 6, at 301.
11. Id.
12. See Burdick, General Survey, V3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Law (1909); Reports
of the Court of Common Pleas of England 1622-1625 at 24.
13. Angel, supra note 6, at 280.
14. Id.
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products are those of the plaintiff." 5 Generally, to receive protection
under the passing off theory, the plaintiff or injured party must establish
three elements. First, the plaintiff must establish that secondary meaning
exists.' 6 Secondary meaning refers to the "association formed in the
mind of the consumer which links an individual product with its manu-
facturer or distributor." 7 Regarding literary titles, secondary meaning
will be found where, "in the minds of a significant number of people, the
title in question is associated with a single source of the literary work."' 8
Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used the plaintiff's
title for the defendant's own work in a way that was meant to confuse the
public into thinking that the defendant's work and the plaintiff's work
were somehow related. Finally, the plaintiff must show that because of
this confusion, the plaintiff has been damaged. 9
. The other unfair competition cause of action, misappropriation, is
defined as the "taking and use of another's property for the sole purpose
of capitalizing unfairly on the good will2" and reputation of the property
owner."'" Protection under the misappropriation theory is generally
found where (1) there has been a substantial investment of time, effort
and money made by the plaintiff in the thing created such that the court
can characterize that "thing" as a type of property right; (2) the defend-
ant appropriated the "thing" at little or no cost; and (3) the plaintiff is
thereby injured.22
Although the courts often confuse and interchange the passing off
and misappropriation doctrines, they are different. The passing off the-
ory is specifically directed at preventing confusion as to the source of the
goods,23 while the misappropriation doctrine attempts to protect a more
15. Smith v. Montero, 648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981).
16. For an in-depth discussion of secondary meaning, see infra notes 149-342 and accom-
panying text.
17. J. Josephson, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 357 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
18. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:4, at 332; but see infra notes 64-93 for a discussion of
New York unfair competition law where secondary meaning is not a prerequisite. For an in-
depth discussion of secondary meaning, see infra notes 149-342 and accompanying text.
19. Curtis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 468, 295 P.2d 62,
67 (1956).
20. The term "good will" has been defined as "[tihe favorable consideration shown by the
purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source." White Tower Sys. v.
White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 720 (1937).
21. Pocket Books, Inc. v. Dell Publishing Co., 49 Misc. 2d 252, 256, 267 N.Y.S.2d 269,
272 (1966).
22. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:25, at 396.
23. Id.
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general "quasi-property right."24 Because of this difference, the misap-
propriation doctrine generally embraces a wider scope of equitable
wrongs than the passing off theory.25 Therefore, a court could find that
there has been no passing off where the parties involved are not in close
competition, and yet the misappropriation doctrine may be applicable
because the defendant has traded on the good will of the plaintiff in
adopting the title or tradename of plaintiff's literary work for a non-com-
peting market.26
While most courts allow an injured plaintiff some sort of relief under
the passing off theory,2 7 the misappropriation doctrine has not been uni-
formly adopted by the courts.2" This is due, in large part, to the Supreme
Court decisions in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 29 and Compco
Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, 30 often referred to as the Sears-Compco
cases. In this pair of cases, the United States Supreme Court held that a
state could not, through its unfair competition laws, prohibit the copying
of an article that failed to qualify for protection under federal patent and
copyright statutes, even though that article might have acquired a secon-
dary meaning.3'
While the Court's rulings clearly prohibit states from protecting ar-
ticles that were already covered by patent and copyright law, many
courts, including those in California,32 interpreted the Sears-Compco de-
cisions to mean that state protection for titles had been preempted.
These state courts relied in large part on the Court's statement:
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright,
state law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid
copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in art. I,
section 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.33
The Supreme Court later clarified the reach of the Sears-Compco
decisions in Goldstein v. California. " In that case, Goldstein and other
24. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918).
25. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:26, at 398.
26. Angel, supra note 6, at 302-03.
27. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
28. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:26, at 398.
29. 376 U.S. 225, reh'g denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
30. 376 U.S. 234, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
31. Angel, supra note 6, at 282.
32. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
33. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
34. 412 U.S. 546 (1972), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
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appellants were convicted of ten counts of record piracy under section
653h of the California Penal Code. 35 The appellants allegedly bought
commercially produced recordings of major musical artists and, without
any authorization or license, reproduced those recordings on blank
tapes.36 The tapes were labelled with information identical to that of the
original recordings and distributed to retail outlets for sale to the pub-
lic. 37 On appeal, appellants argued that the California penal statute con-
flicted with the Sears-Compco holdings-that since the musical
recordings were not protected under the federal copyright law, Congress
intended to allow them to be copied. Rejecting the appellants' argument,
the Supreme Court held that the states share with Congress the power to
grant copyright protection, and that Sears-Compco was not a federal pre-
emption of state protection for categories of writings where no protection
is granted under federal statutory copyright.38 Thus, Goldstein stands for
the proposition that the states can utilize common law remedies and the
Sears-Compeco doctrine is restricted to works protected under federal pat-
ent and copyright laws.
Section 301(b) of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 39 adopted
three years after Goldstein, reinforces Goldstein by specifically allowing
states to utilize common law remedies," such as passing off and misap-
propriation. That section provides that "[n]othing in this title annuls or
limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any
state with respect to ... activities violating legal or equitable rights that
are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by section 106."'" While unfair competition law
is therefore a viable means of protection, the amount of legal protection
currently available to literary titles differs greatly depending upon the
jurisdiction in which the plaintiff pleads his case.42
35. Id. at 549.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 550.
38. Id. at 558.
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1989).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1989).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1989).
42. During the legislation process, misappropriation was specifically named in the Senate
version of § 301(b)(3) as a right not subject to federal preemption. It was later deleted, how-
ever, at the Department of Justice's behest and this has been construed by some states as a
prohibition by Congress to allow state protection. "A reading of the legislative hearings on
misappropriation, however, would tend to negate any presumption one way or the other."
Angel, supra note 6, at 283. For a detailed summary of these hearings see MCCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 10:30, at 411-16.
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1. California
While many jurisdictions embrace the misappropriation doctrine,
California does not.43 In California, therefore, an unfair competition ac-
tion must be based on the passing off theory." California courts, both
before and after the Goldstein decision,45 hold that "the misappropriation
theory of state protection ... retains no vitality."46 As the court ex-
plained in Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, " "the state's power
to protect literary titles, which are not afforded protection by federal
copyright laws, cannot be based on any theory of appropriation of a
property right."4 8 The court further explained that an action must be
based on the passing off theory of unfair competition because "[a] title of
a literary product is, like a label on other types of products, simply a
means of identifying a product."49
In California, protection under the passing off theory will be granted
only upon a showing of secondary meaning,50 likelihood of confusion,51
and injury.52 The key to the passing off cause of action is the title's at-
taining a secondary meaning in the mind of the public." The plaintiff's
establishment of secondary meaning in his title is "a sine qua non of
protection of titles on a theory of unfair competition."54
For example, in Allied, the plaintiff, Allied Artists, acquired United
States distribution rights to the French film Histoire d'O.55 The film was
based on the well-known erotic French novel of the same name. 56 When
Friedman used the title "The Journey of 0" for a film, Allied Artists
brought an unfair competition action claiming that its title, "The Story of
43. Angel, supra note 6, at 281, n.8.
44. Id.
45. Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971), was
decided before Goldstein, while Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d
127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977), and Lutz v. De Laurentiis, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1989), were decided after Goldstein.
46. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
47. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
48. Id. at 133, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
49. Id.
50. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
51. Id. at 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
52. Id.
53. Anthony & Finkelstein, supra note 8, at 146. The term "public," "does not mean all
the people, nor most of the people, nor very many of the people of a place, but so many as
contradistinguishes them from a few." Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 12 Cal. 2d 501, 514,
86 P.2d 102, 108 (1939).
54. Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 35, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499,
501-02 (1969).
55. Anglicization: "The Story of 0."
56. Allied, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 131, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
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0," had acquired the requisite secondary meaning through the distribu-
tion of the book "Histoire d'O" in the United States. 7 The California
Court of Appeal held that Allied's title, "The Story of 0" had indeed
acquired secondary meaning in the United States with respect to the
book and with "that element of the United States society that reads such
material associated with the title 'The Story of 0' with the English trans-
lation of 'Histoire d'O.' "58
California's reluctance to grant common law protection to single lit-
erary titles is evident in the remedy fashioned by the California Court of
Appeal in Allied Artists. Typically, courts grant an injunction prohibit-
ing the use of any title which unfairly competes with a plaintiff's title.
The Allied Artists court, however, felt constrained by precedent to limit
its remedy to requiring the defendant to take reasonable steps to dispel
the likelihood of confusion by including disclaimers in its national adver-
tising, stating that "[t]he available protection in the area of titles is 'lim-
ited, however, to a narrowly drawn injunction requiring appropriate
precautions to prevent public confusion. . . .' "" The Allied Artists deci-
sion severely restricts the passing off theory in California.' Thus, a
plaintiff who can demonstrate that another court-state or federal-has
jurisdiction to hear his unfair competition claim may be well advised to
pursue that other venue. The reason for filing elsewhere is that, while the
causes of action available to a plaintiff in California are so few (one), the
burden of proof so demanding (secondary meaning a prerequisite), and
the remedy so narrow (implementation of a disclaimer), other jurisdic-
tions, such as New York, provide a plaintiff with a variety of theories
upon which to base his unfair competition claim.
2. New York
In New York, literary titles can be protected against unfair competi-
tion under both the passing off and misappropriation theories,61 as well
as a dilution theory.62 The addition of the misappropriation cause of
action allows a plaintiff to protect his title in cases where the defendant is
trading on the plaintiff's good will by adopting the title of plaintiff's liter-
ary work, but the use occurs in a non-competing market, rendering the
57. Id. at 132, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97.
58. Id. at 136, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
59. Id. (quoting Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 235, 96 Cal. Rptr.
118, 123 (1971)).
60. Angel, supra note 6, at 304.
61. Id. at 281, n.8.
62. Id. at 305-06.
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passing off action unavailable.6"
The most notable difference between California and New York in
unfair competition cases is that California requires that the plaintiff es-
tablish secondary meaning in order to gain title protection," while in
New York a plaintiff is not required to do so.65 This is not to say, how-
ever, that proof of secondary meaning is not important in an unfair com-
petition cause of action in New York. In many unfair competition cases,
the establishment of secondary meaning plays a major role in a court's
determination that passing off exists.66 However, where a plaintiff can
establish that the defendant acted in a manner that seeks to exploit or
injure the plaintiff, the secondary meaning element of an unfair competi-
tion claim is not required.67
As the court stated in J. Josephson, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 68 "[a]bsent secondary meaning, [the] plaintiff may prove that [the]
defendant was engaged in one of a number of predatory practices which,
per se, amount to unfair competition. These include palming off, actual
deception, appropriation of plaintiff's property, and interference with
plaintiff's contractual rights.",69 This difference appears to allow a plain-
tiff to point to the defendant's actions and, if found to rise to the level of
"predatory practices," the court will not require the plaintiff to undergo
the more arduous task of proving secondary meaning.7 °
A third theory for relief available in New York is an anti-dilution
cause of action codified as General Business Law section 368-d. 71 The
63. Id. at 305.
64. Id. at 302.
65. National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 733, 747
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
66. Angel, supra note 6, at 302.
67. J. Josephson, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 357 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
68. 357 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
69. Id. at 1048; Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
70. For a discussion of how secondary meaning may be proven, see infra notes 152-154
and accompanying text.
71. § 368-d states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of
a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement
of a mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstand-
ing the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to
the source of goods or services.
While California has an anti-dilution statute which is almost identical to New York's § 368-d
(California Business and Professions Code § 14330), it has yet to be applied by California state
courts as a cause of action for literary title cases. THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK Assoc.,
STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, § B.10, at CA-5 (1989).
1990]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
concept of dilution is:
most applicable where [a] subsequent user use[s] the trademark
of [a] prior user for a product so dissimilar from the product of
the prior user and there is no likelihood of confusion of the
products or sources, but where the use of the trademark by the
subsequent user will lessen [the] uniqueness of the prior user's
mark with the possible future result that a strong mark may
become a weak mark.72
The gravamen of the dilution cause of action is that a defendant's contin-
ual use of a mark similar to the plaintiff's title will "inexorably have an
adverse effect upon the value of the plaintiff's mark, and that, if he is
powerless to prevent such use, the plaintiff's mark will eventually be de-
prived of all distinctiveness."73
In applying the anti-dilution statute to literary cases, New York
courts hold that to plead a successful cause of action under section 368-d,
the plaintiff must prove: (1) notice to defendants that there will be dilu-
tion of the mark or title that will have a detrimental effect;74 (2) that the
name or title to be protected possesses a distinctive quality or has ac-
quired secondary meaning;75 and (3) that the name or title is capable of
dilution.7 6 A dilution statute is not meant to replace the common law of
unfair competition,77 but instead should be seen as a supplement to com-
mon law rights.
78
The dilution cause of action is distinguishable from the passing off
cause of action in that the injuries sustained under each differ.7" The
injury suffered by a plaintiff in a situation involving passing off is a fairly
immediate loss of sales due to diversion of patronage from the plaintiff to
the defendant, ° whereas "dilution is a cancer which, if allowed to
spread, will slowly but inevitably destroy the advertising value of the
mark."' 81 On the other hand, the dilution and misappropriation causes of
72. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, C.A. Fla., 481 F.2d 445, 450 (5th Cir.
1973).
73. King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
74. Angel, supra note 6, at 306.
75. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 545, 399
N.Y.S.2d 628, 632, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (1977).
76. Id.
77. R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, § 84.2, at 1646 (2d ed.
1950) [hereinafter CALLMAN].
78. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., 351 Mass. 283, 218
N.E.2d 564 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1966).
79. CALLMANN, supra note 77, § 84.2, at 1643.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963)).
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action may be seen as mutually dependent. A showing of dilution will
facilitate the establishment of a misappropriation cause of action by ful-
filling the injury requirement.8 2 At the same time, establishment of mis-
appropriation will bolster the plaintiff's argument that his title has
thereby been diluted.
In National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., " the
plaintiff, National Lampoon, utilized passing off, the misappropriation
doctrine, and dilution theories, as well as section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act8 4 to prevent its namesake from being used by American Broadcast-
ing Companies ("ABC") for its own television series.85 ABC entered
into negotiations with National Lampoon to determine whether National
Lampoon's particularly virulent brand of humor could be converted into
a television series.s6 Without reaching an agreement with the plaintiffs,
ABC decided to develop its own program to be entitled "Lampoon" or
"ABC Lampoon" using the same type of humor for which National
Lampoon was known.87 National Lampoon sued to enjoin ABC's use of
such title claiming that the National Lampoon name would be harmed
by ABC's use.88 The district court found evidence that National Lam-
poon was entitled to relief under state unfair competition theories, dilu-
tion of trademark, and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.89
Addressing the issue of secondary meaning, the court stated that
while there was strong evidence of secondary meaning," ° the law of un-
fair competition no longer required that plaintiff's item acquire a secon-
dary meaning. 9' Instead, the court found that under New York case law,
the likelihood of damage through dilution of a mark was enough.
9 2
The district court's holding in National Lampoon appears to mean
that, while a plaintiff must still prove that he possesses a distinctive
mark, he need only prove likelihood of dilution to receive title protection,
82. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of a
misappropriation cause of action.
83. 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 746-47. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the
§ 43(a) claim in National Lampoon.
85. National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 736.
86. Id. at 740-42.
87. Id. at 744.
88. Id. at 736.
89. Id. at 746-47. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the
§ 43(a) claim in National Lampoon.
90. National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 747.
91. Id. (citing Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 328, 329-30, 122
N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (1953)).
92. Id. at 747 (citing Renofab Process Corp. v. Renotex Corp., 158 N.Y.S.2d 70, 77
(1956)).
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and need not prove that his mark has already established a secondary
meaning."a All in all, the New York courts' acceptance of all three un-
fair competition theories, as well as their move away from the secondary
meaning standard, affords plaintiffs a better opportunity to protect their
literary titles than that accorded plaintiffs in California. Regardless of
whether a state's unfair competition laws are favorable, a plaintiff may
still have the option of pleading his action in federal court.
B. Federal Protection
Literary titles are protected by the federal trademark law known as
the Lanham Act94 ("the Act"). Titles of serial works, such as radio and
television programs, which are protected under copyright law, are also
protected under section 45 of the Lanham Act.95 Single literary titles,
which do not fall under the provisions of section 45 and do not receive
copyright protection, can be protected by applying section 43(a) of the
Act. "Construed broadly, this statute may be found to incorporate both
the misappropriation and misrepresentation [passing off] aspects of the
unfair competition claims . ,,96 Section 43(a) grants a cause of action
to persons engaged in interstate commerce to protect themselves against
the misleading or deceptive use of common law trademarks and the simi-
lar misuse of such words, names, or symbols used by a competitor to
identify his goods or services.97 Section 43(a) reads:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connec-
tion with any goods or services, or any container or containers
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who
shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin
or description or representation cause or procure the same to be
transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any
93. While there is a line of federal cases which hold that likelihood of confusion must be
shown, they have been overruled. THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK Assoc., STATE TRADE-
MARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, § N.Y.4, at B-5 (1989); Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra
Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1983).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1053-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1989).
95. "Titles, character names and other distinctive features of radio or television programs
may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise
the goods of the sponsor." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 1989).
96. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Division of General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 291, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
97. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1963).
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carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated,
or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be dam-
aged by the use of any such false description or repre-
sentation.9
To obtain an injunction, prohibiting use of a title under the Lanham
Act, three general requirements must be proven: (1) the goods or serv-
ices are involved in interstate commerce; (2) the defendant has misrepre-
sented his or her product;99 and (3) this misrepresentation is likely to
cause public confusion.' °° In order to obtain damages, however, it is
necessary that the plaintiff prove actual confusion. 101 If the plaintiff can
show that the defendant deliberately misappropriated the plaintiff's title
or mark, the courts will infer that the public confusion requirement of
this cause of action has been satisfied. 102
1. Ninth Circuit/California
All three requirements must be met in order to state a cause of ac-
tion under section 43(a).1°3 However, some district courts, including
those in California, have held the misrepresentation requirement to mean
that the plaintiff must prove passing off."° Since California requires a
showing of secondary meaning in order to successfully plead a cause of
action in passing off, a plaintiff seeking title protection under section
43(a) in a California district court has a more difficult task than his New
York counterpart because the New York state law does not require a
showing of secondary meaning in order to prove an unfair competition
claim.'0 5 This was made clear in Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures
Corp. 106
In Chamberlain, the trustees of the estate of Samuel Clemens (better
known as Mark Twain), brought an unfair competition suit against Co-
lumbia Pictures for releasing its motion picture entitled Best Man Wins.
98. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
99. Misrepresentation need not be intentional. Parkway Baking Co., Inc. v. Freihofer
Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1968).
100. Anthony & Finkelstein, supra note 8, at 153.
101. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 839 (1965). For discussion of damages, see infra notes 636-70 and accompanying
text.
102. Hesmer Foods, 346 F.2d at 359.
103. For full text of § 43(a), see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
104. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
105. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
106. 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
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Best Man Wins was loosely based on Mark Twain's "The Celebrated
Jumping Frog of Calaveras County." Although the plaintiffs did not
own the copyright to "The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras
County"-the work having entered the public domain° 7-they claimed
unfair competition and violation of the estate's trademark rights.
10 8
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants advertised Best Man Wins in such a
way as to give the impression that Samuel Clemens was the author of the
story."co The advertisements included such statements as "Mark Twain's
Favorite Story," "A Story Only Mark Twain Could Tell," and "Mark
Twain's Tale of a Gamble in Hearts."1 0 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that while the plaintiffs' allegations "fit snugly into the pro-
visions of [section 43(a)],"' the court did not think they were sufficient
to sustain a cause of action under the Lanham Act:
[W]e do not think said section [43(a)] changes the fundamental
requirements necessary to sustain a suit for unfair competition,
one such requirement being a direct injury to the property rights
of a complainant by passing off the particular goods or services
misrepresented as those of the complainant. Deceiving the
public by fraudulent means, while an important factor in such a
suit, does not give the right of action unless it results in the sale
of the goods as those of the complainant." 2
2. Second Circuit/New York
In National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 113 the
plaintiffs were successful, under section 43(a), in preventing the defend-
ant's use of their namesake. The court stated that a cause of action arises
under section 43(a) when a name or trademark is used in interstate com-
merce in such a way that it is likely to cause confusion or deceive pur-
chasers as to the source of origin." 4 Because National Lampoon's
magazine and ABC's television program were in completely different me-
dia fields, the court addressed the issue of whether National Lampoon
107. While anyone has the right to use a title that has entered the public domain, that title
may not be used to deceive the public so that if a work has acquired a secondary meaning, a
court may require subsequent users to distinguish their particular versions. See, G. & C. Mer-
riam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 237 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1914).
108. Chamberlain, 186 F.2d at 923-24.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 924.
111. Id. at 925.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
114. Id. at 746 (citing Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 266-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
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had standing to sue. The contention was that because the titles were to
be used in different media fields, National Lampoon would not be dam-
aged by the defendant's use of the term "Lampoon."" ' 5 The district
court declared:
Standing to sue exists in anyone who "is or is likely to be dam-
aged" by the defendant's use of the disputed mark, and the par-
ties need not be direct competitors.
Although plaintiff has not yet produced a television pro-
gram for national broadcast, it has begun production of pro-
grams for closed-circuit television and is negotiating for
production of a special program which it hopes to sell to one of
the large networks. Network television is within the plaintiff's
area of natural expansion; it is now making efforts to expand
into that area. As we have already pointed out, broadcast of
defendants' program will effectively cut off such expansion." 6
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that two programs with similar names would indeed cause confusion and
therefore injury." 7 The court concluded that ABC's conduct showed a
deliberate intent to trade upon the reputation and national acceptance
built up by National Lampoon and to pass off "Lampoon" or "ABC
Lampoon" as a National Lampoon product.118
While section 43(a) provides plaintiffs with the advantages of an al-
ternative forum and an additional cause of action in jurisdictions such as
New York, the benefits to a plaintiff in a California federal court appear
to be more imaginary than real. By equating the likelihood of confusion
requirement" 9 in section 43(a) with establishment of secondary meaning,
there is little reason-except maybe a shorter docket backlog-to seek
protection in California federal court as opposed to California state
court. Practically, the section 43(a) alternative is no alternative at all.
As long as California federal courts require plaintiffs to prove secondary
meaning, section 43(a) will be little more than a federal version of Cali-
fornia's passing off law and the impetus to forum shop will remain.
III. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
With title protection playing such an important role in the econom-
115. National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 746.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text for discussion of the elements of a
§ 43(a) cause of action.
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ics of the film industry, the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA") has attempted to accomplish through self-help a degree of
protection for titles not available from the law.120 The MPAA operates a
Title Registration Bureau through which more than five thousand titles
are registered per year. 121 The members of the MPAA, which include
"those individuals or companies engaged in the production or distribu-
tion of theatrical motion pictures for release in the United States[,]
... " 122 contractually agree to "register the title of each and every one of
their United States theatrical motion pictures with the Title Registration
Bureau."'' 23 These registration regulations state that the first member
"to submit a particular title shall be given the priority registration posi-
tion by the Title Registration Bureau." '24 Registration gives that mem-
ber prior rights to the title for a certain period of time.125 Besides
facilitating the policing of previously registered titles, the Title Registra-
tion Bureau also handles title "conflicts" that may arise among its
members.
The MPAA defines a title "conflict" as "the harmful similarity of
titles which may cause public confusion as to the identity or origin of a
theatrical motion picture."' 26 Once a member complains that a conflict
exists, the protested title cannot be used by the would-be registrant until
usage rights are determined. 27 Determination of usage rights may be
resolved either by direct negotiations between the two members or,
should that fail, through arbitration. 2 '
To prove that a "conflict" exists, the protesting member must show
(1) similarity of titles and (2) likelihood of harm.'2 9 If the arbitration
board, which consists of three disinterested members of the Title Regis-
tration Bureau's Title Committee, finds that a harmful similarity exists,
that title becomes unavailable for use by the would-be registrant.' 30 The
Title Committee's finding, subject to the right of appeal,' is binding on
120. Netterville & Hirsch, Privacy and Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 101,
104 (1959).
121. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:13, at 359.
122. Article I, § (a) of the April 1, 1986, Memorandum of the Title Committee of the Mo-
tion Picture Association of America, Inc. [hereinafter the MPAA Memorandum].
123. Article II, § (a) of the MPAA Memorandum.
124. Article II, § (b) of the MPAA Memorandum.
125. Article II, § (b) of the MPAA Memorandum.
126. Article III, § (a) of the MPAA Memorandum.
127. Article III, § (b) of the MPAA Memorandum.
128. Article III, § (c) of the MPAA Memorandum.
129. Article III, § (a) of the MPAA Memorandum.
130. Article III, § (c) of the MPAA Memorandum.
131. Article III, § (e) of the MPAA Memorandum.
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the parties to the arbitration.'32 The arbitration procedure not only de-
termines whether or not a member's use of a title is authorized, but may
carry with it sanctions for unauthorized use of a title. 33 Sanctions range
from an award of $2,500 liquidated damages, to the attorneys' fees and
costs sustained in order to enforce the Title Committee's findings,' 34 to
termination of registration privileges of the member.'35
Contractually, members are bound to the arbitration results. How-
ever, in at least one case, this contractual arrangement has not hindered
the members from filing further suit in state or federal courts. In Gordon
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., '36 the California Court of Appeal ap-
peared to give little or no weight to the Title Registration Bureau's deci-
sion that defendant's use of the title "The FBI Story" was not a violation
of plaintiff's rights. The court noted that both parties had registered the
title "The FBI Story" with the Title Registration Bureau within one
week of each other, but refused to find that the plaintiff's use of the title
was protected by unfair competition law.'3 7 In remanding the case, the
court of appeal held that, upon a showing of secondary meaning, plaintiff
would be entitled to protection.138 Since the updated 1986 Title Regis-
tration Bureau Memorandum explicitly provides that arbitration is bind-
ing on all parties involved, cases such as Gordon are not likely to occur in
the future.
IV. SUMMARY
Substantial capital, time and energy is often invested in making the
public aware of a literary title. 139 As the law currently exists, however,
this investment does not necessarily result in protection. In order to pro-
tect a literary title, it has been suggested that one should select a more
fanciful title."' ° This, it is hoped, will cut down on the number of prior
uses of the identical or similar title. Preventative measures, such as a
title search, conducted through the Copyright Office at a cost of $10 per
132. Article III, § (c) of the MPAA Memorandum.
133. Article IV, § (c) of the MPAA Memorandum.
134. Article IV, § (c) of the MPAA Memorandum.
135. Article V, § (d) of the MPAA Memorandum.
136. 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1969).
137. Id. at 39-40, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
138. Id. at 38-39, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
139. Angel, supra note 6, at 280.
140. Perry, supra note 1, at 8. A name or title is considered fanciful when it does not, by its
usual and ordinary meaning, denote or describe the production or work to which it is applied.
Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432, 445 (D. Neb. 1943). For a
more in-depth discussion of fanciful titles, see infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
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hour,'4 1 will give the proposed user an idea of whether or not a conflict
exists with an earlier user.
14 2
Once a title is decided upon, protection is furthered by building up
the title's secondary meaning. 4 ' Pre-release publicity is probably advan-
tageous in that the sooner the public associates the title with the particu-
lar work, the sooner secondary meaning will be established. Whether or
not the jurisdiction requires a showing of secondary meaning, it is always
helpful in pleading an action in unfair competition.
Correspondingly, if the work is a radio or television series, the user
should have the title federally registered under section 45 of the Lanham
Act as the title of a series.'" If, however, a single literary title is used,
the title, character names and program features should be used on collat-
eral products, such as those that are often used to promote movies.
4 5
Such products include buttons, posters and T-shirts.' 46 The title may be
registered as a trademark for these products'47 and, as a consequence, the
single literary title will be protected. Some have proposed that a Federal
Literary Title Statute be adopted to specifically protect literary titles. 4 '
However, until a statute which addresses the intricacies of title law is
adopted, the use of publicity, distinctive title selection and collateral
product trademarking should be employed as early as possible to ensure
protection.
Whitney Hartford Conant
PART II: SECONDARY MEANING
I. INTRODUCTION
Although federal law allows registration of a title for a series of liter-
ary works, the problem facing a plaintiff who has a single literary title is
that the title cannot be registered. 149 The producer can only get protec-
141. Perry, supra note 1, at 8.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. For a discussion of § 45 of the Lanham Act, see supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
145. Perry, supra note 1, at 8.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Angel, supra note 6, at 312-14.
149. If a work is considered a series it has a trademark function and as such can be federally
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tion for his or her single literary title if the title has acquired secondary
meaning. 50 Secondary meaning is defined as the meaning "that attaches
to descriptive words 'that have been used so long and so exclusively by
one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that
branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean
that the article was his product.' "151 Secondary meaning can protect
one producer's title from usurpation by another producer who wishes to
use the same title. On the other hand, if a producer can show that a
previously used title has not yet acquired secondary meaning, he or she
may be free to use it. This section will point out how a producer can
prove secondary meaning and also, by implication, what is needed to
refute the acquisition of secondary meaning.
The general test for secondary meaning is whether in the minds of a
substantial number of people the title can be associated with a single
source. 52 The question of whether a title has acquired secondary mean-
ing is a question of fact.153 But once secondary meaning is established,
registered without having to show secondary meaning. Application of Cooper, 254 F.2d 611,
615 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958). A series is defined as not being descriptive
of any one work and each work within the series having its own individual title. Motown
Prods., Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 285, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) rev'd on other grounds,
849 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1988).
In Application of Cooper, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeal did not find that the
title "Teeny Big" was registrable as a trademark for books since it was the title of a single
work. Cooper, 254 F.2d at 616. The court stated that the name for a series could function as a
trademark, indicating that each work within the series comes from a single source; however, a
book title only identifies a specific work and as such is not associated in the public mind with a
single source (i.e., the publisher). Id. at 615.
In Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., the Second Circuit reached a similar deci-
sion in finding that neither of the parties' television shows could be deemed a series since the
individual shows did not have individual names or titles. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 288. The
court said that the name "Nightlife" describes each show, as well as each series as a whole. Id.
Thus, according to Cooper and Motown, a television series such as The Twilight Zone, which
has individual titles for each of its segments, may be entitled to protection without having to go
through the rigors of proving secondary meaning (assuming "The Twilight Zone" is
distinctive).
150. "A sine qua non of protection of titles on a theory of unfair competition is the estab-
lishment by the plaintiff of a secondary meaning in his title." Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 35, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501 (1969). See also Jackson v.
Universal Int'l Pictures, 36 Cal. 2d 116, 121, 222 P.2d 433, 436 (1950); Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 134, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1977); Cowles Magazines
and Broadcasting, Inc. v. Elysium, Inc., 255 Cal. App. 2d 731, 733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509
(1967).
151. McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 709, 225 N.Y.S.2d
646, 652 (1962) (quoting G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield Pub. Co., 198 F. 369 (6th Cir.
1912), modified and aff'd, 238 F. 1, cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917)).
152. 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:4, at 331-32 (2d
ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
153. Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 121, 222 P.2d 433, 437 (1950);
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the title may be protected throughout the United States.'54
A. Type of Title: Effect on Secondary Meaning
In the protection of registerable trademarks, the classification of the
mark is extremely important. If the mark is generic it can never function
as a trademark, 155 yet if the mark is suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful it
will be afforded protection without having to show secondary mean-
ing.156 Distinctive marks1 57 are protected immediately upon adoption
and use."5 ' This is where the requirement for priority of use becomes
important-if two people have the same or similar marks, the prior user
will be protected.' 59
In affording protection to a literary title, courts examine the title
itself to see if it is merely generic or descriptive, which is a "weak mark,"
or if it is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive, which is a "strong mark."
Unlike ordinary trademarks, protection of literary titles generally re-
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 134, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98
(1977); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 30, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837
(1963); Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc. v. Elysium, Inc., 255 Cal. App. 2d 731, 735,
63 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (1967); Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App.
2d 796, 813, 187 P.2d 474, 484 (1947); International Film Serv. Co. v. Associated Prod., Inc.,
273 F. 585, 587 (D.C.N.Y. 1921).
154. "The title of a play produced only in New York may acquire a secondary meaning
which entitles it to protection throughout the United States." Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pic-
tures, 36 Cal. 2d 116, 122, 222 P.2d 433, 437 (1950) (citing Hemingway v. Film Alliance of the
United States, Inc., 174 Misc. 725, 726, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (1940); Frohman v. Payton, 34
Misc. 275, 276, 68 N.Y.S. 849 (1901); Aronson v. Fleckenstein, 28 F. 75, 78 (1886)).
155. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 15:1, at 658. See also Reese Pub. Co. v. Hampton Int'l
Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1980); CES Pub. Corp. v. St. Regis Pubs., Inc.,
531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1975); National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376
F. Supp. 733, 748 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
In CES Publishing, the plaintiff, who published a magazine entitled Consumer Electronics
Monthly, sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing his magazine entitled Consumer Elec-
tronics Product New& The Second Circuit found that the use of the words "consumer electron-
ics" described the "class of trade magazines within that industry" and, as such, the title was
generic and not entitled to registration. CES Publishing, 531 F.2d at 14. In holding that
generic terms cannot be rescued as trademarks by proof of secondary meaning, the court stated
that "[t]o allow trademark protection for generic terms, i.e., names which describe the genus of
goods being sold, even when these [terms] have become identified with a first user, would grant
the owner of the mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe his goods as what
they are." Id. at 13.
156. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 11:2, at 435. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit stated, "the 'Play-
boy' mark is suggestive rather than descriptive and as such is entitled to protection without
proof of secondary meaning." Playboy, 687 F.2d at 566 (citing McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v.
Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1979).
157. "Distinctive marks" are those that are referred to as suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful.
158. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 11:2, at 435.
159. Id.
[Vol. 10
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
quires proof of secondary meaning."6 Determining which class the title
falls within is essential because the categorization determines how much
proof of secondary meaning is required, whether the title may be pro-
tected at all, and the extent of relief the court will afford the title. Proof
of secondary meaning is required for even the most distinctive of titles
because titles are per se descriptive of the literary works themselves.' 6 '
Each title is a term used to describe the product, as opposed to a mark
which is used to designate a single source. 1
62
1. Generic
A "generic" term is defined as a term that refers "to the genus of
which the particular product is a species." '63 A word is generic when it
becomes the name used for a particular product, for example "Aspirin"
for acetyl salicylic acid."6
New York courts afford protection to generic terms, but to receive
such protection, the plaintiff must prove that the mark has acquired sec-
ondary meaning. In McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random House, Inc., 165
the plaintiff whose book title was "PT-109: John F. Kennedy in World
War II," tried to prevent the defendant from using the title "John F.
Kennedy and PT-109." The court stated that "[w]ords or phrases which
have been in common use, which are descriptive or generic, or which
constitute the true and generally accepted name by which an article or
thing is called, may not be appropriated by anyone to his exclusive
use."' 16 6 However, the court qualified its statement by holding that if the
title had acquired secondary meaning, the rules of unfair competition
would prevent the use of the same title by another. 167 The court found
160. Id. § 10:2, at 323. But see supra text accompanying notes 64-93 for a discussion of
unfair competition in New York where proof of secondary meaning is not always required.
161. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 10:2, at 326. See Application of Cooper, 254 F.2d 611
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958). The court in Cooper gives a wonderful explana-
tion of the reasoning for denying registration for a single literary title even if the title is "dis-
tinctive." The court explained, "[b]ut however arbitrary, novel or nondescriptive of [the
book's] contents the name of a book-its title-may be, it nevertheless describes the book." Id.
at 615 (emphasis in original).
162. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 10:2, at 324.
163. Reese Pub. Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 10 (2d Cir. 1980)
(citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
164. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.C.N.Y. 1921).
165. 32 Misc. 2d 704, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1962).
166. Id. at 708, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 651. See also Litwin v. Maddux, 7 Misc. 2d 750, 164
N.Y.S.2d 489 (1957). The New York court stated, "[g]eneric and descriptive words will not
ordinarily be protected by injunction, particularly where no fraud or deception in the use of a
similar title by another was intended . I..." d  at 757, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
167. McGraw-Hill, 32 Misc. 2d at 708, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
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that, even assuming the plaintiff's work had established secondary mean-
ing, this did not mean that the defendant was competing unfairly with
the plaintiff. 16
California courts likewise allow protection to generic titles upon a
showing of secondary meaning. For example, in West v. Lind, 169 the
plaintiff, Mae West, sought to enjoin the defendant from using the name
"Diamond Lil" as her stage name. The court held that "while generic
terms... are not subject to exclusive appropriation, if a plaintiff proves
that such a name or word has been so exclusively identified with his
goods or business as to have acquired a secondary meaning . . .he is
entitled to relief against another's deceptive use of such terms."' 7 ° How-
ever, the court found against Mae West, stating that there would be no
likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's use of the name and the
defendant's use.'71
2. Descriptive
A "descriptive" term is illustrative of the nature of the product it
identifies, for example, "Bufferin" for buffered aspirin.'7 2  Although
courts consider all single literary titles to be descriptive, titles are pro-
tected upon a showing of secondary meaning. For example, in the Sec-
ond Circuit case of Orion Pictures Co. v. Dell Publishing Co., 173 the title
"A Little Romance" was deemed descriptive of the contents of plaintiff's
film, yet was protected because the title had acquired secondary mean-
ing. 174 The court held that "an inference of secondary meaning, properly
supported, seems to be enough" to allow the claimant protection when
one is dealing with a descriptive term. 175 The court found that an infer-
ence of secondary meaning had been supported in Orion because of the
extensive pre-release publicity of the film and, accordingly, protected the
168. Id. at 709, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 652. See infra text accompanying notes 343-519 for a
discussion of "Likelihood of Confusion."
169. 186 Cal. App. 2d 563, 9 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1960).
170. Id. at 567, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 291. See also Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Elysium, Inc., 255 Cal. App. 2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1967), where the generic term "look"
(the name of plaintiff's magazine) was not capable of being used exclusively by the plaintiff
unless it had acquired a secondary meaning. Id. at 735, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The court stated
that the secondary meaning that had attached to Look would reach no further than is neces-
sary to prevent public confusion. Id. at 736, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
171. West, 186 Cal. App. 2d at 567, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 291. See infra text accompanying notes
343-519 for a discussion of what constitutes "confusion."
172. Wise v. Bristol-Myers Co., 107 F. Supp. 800 (D.C.N.Y. 1952).
173. 471 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
174. Id. at 396.
175. Id. (citing W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir. 1970)).
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plaintiff's title.'76
In the Ninth Circuit case of Fishier v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., " the plaintiffs failed to show that secondary meaning had at-
tached to their use of the descriptive title "Virgin Queen."' 7 8 The plain-
tiffs' play had never been performed and had very little publicity. The
only evidence plaintiffs had of secondary meaning, was an informational
letter sent by them to motion picture studios stating that they had writ-
ten a play entitled "Virgin Queen."' 7 9 The court stated that "[t]he title
... is so well known independently of either production that it is com-
monly associated.., with the history of the particular Queen who is the
subject of both plays."' 80 However, the court conceded that a well-
known group of words could nonetheless acquire secondary meaning. 181
In Fishler, the court found that no one associated the title with the plain-
tiffs' play except the plaintiffs and therefore denied them relief.'8 2
3. Suggestive, Arbitrary, and Fanciful Marks
A "suggestive" mark is one that suggests what the product is with-
out actually describing it (i.e., Q-Tips 8 3), while an "arbitrary" term
neither suggests nor describes any characteristic of the product it
names 8 4 (i.e., Tab for sugar-free soda). A "fanciful" mark, on the other
hand, is the most distinctive of all because the mark or name is invented
solely for use as a trademark 185 (i.e., Kodak for camera equipment and
services'"6), but it may be a word that is related to another word or a
word that has now become obsolete.
In the Second Circuit, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful marks are
afforded much protection as shown in WGBH Educational Foundation,
Inc. v. Penthouse International Ltd. 187 In that case, the plaintiff sought
to protect the name "Nova," which it used for a television science pro-
gram, against use of the name by the defendant for its magazine devoted
176. Id. at 396.
177. 159 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
178. Id. at 218.
179. Id. at 216.
180. Id at 217.
181. Id.
182. Fishler, 159 F. Supp. at 218.
183. Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144, 146 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
867 (1953).
184. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 11:4, at 439.
185. Id., § 11:2, at 436.
186. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 137 Misc. 506, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (1930).
187. 453 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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to fantasy and the occult."' 8 The court protected the plaintiff's title be-
cause it was arbitrary, fanciful and nondescriptive as applied to a televi-
sion program and as such, was a strong mark.8 9 Because "Nova" was a
strong mark, the court granted the plaintiff an injunction against the de-
fendant's use of the name in the publishing field.19
In California, a fanciful word is considered a very strong mark and
as such is afforded the greatest trademark protection.1 9' In Johnston v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 192 the title "Queen of the Flat Tops"
was deemed an "arbitrary, fictitious, fanciful, artificial, distinctive and
nondescriptive combination of words"'9 3 as applied to an aircraft carrier.
Because the title was nondescriptive, the court determined that it was a
product of the mind and thus the plaintiffs were the owners of the title
and had the right to its exclusive use.19 4 As a result the plaintiffs' title
was entitled to protection in the motion picture, radio, drama, and televi-
sion areas.' The court in Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 196
pointed out that the holding in Johnston, implying that a fanciful title
may acquire protection without proof of secondary meaning, was dicta
197
and clearly not the law of California. 98
In examining all of the cases, it seems that no matter how fanciful a
title may be, it still must acquire secondary meaning in order to be pro-
tected. However, the classification of the title as generic, descriptive, or
suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful is still important because it may affect
the amount of proof of secondary meaning required. As a general rule, it
is probably more advantageous to the producer if his or her title is a
fanciful combination of words as opposed to words which are generic.
188. Id. at 1348-49.
189. Id. at 1350.
190. Id. at 1352.
191. Time, Inc. v. T.I.M.E., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446 (S.D. Cal. 1954). "[T]he fanciful or
coined word is deemed 'strong' and is more broadly protected as a trade-mark or trade name,
even as to non-competing goods; while the general or descriptive word is considered 'weak' as
a trade name or trade-mark, and is accorded but narrow protection." Id. at 454-55. In Time,
the court held that the word "time" as used by the plaintiff was both ordinary and descriptive
as opposed to coined and fanciful, and thus the protection was limited to the area of news
communication where plaintiff had established some secondary meaning. Id. at 455.
192. 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (1947).
193. Id. at 809, 187 P.2d at 482.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 813, 187 P.2d at 485.
196. 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1969).
197. It was dicta since the plaintiff had proven secondary meaning.
198. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 34 n.l, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
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B. Source Requirement: Specific Producer v. Single Source
The result, or goal, of achieving secondary meaning is the associa-
tion of the literary title with its source."9 9 This is what the producer
must achieve in order to protect his or her title. Jurisdictions differ when
confronted with the issue of source identification. Some require that the
public has to identify the work as coming from a specific identifiable
source, while others hold that it is enough that the public knows that the
work comes from a single, yet anonymous, source.
1. New York/Second Circuit
New York state courts require that the public associate the work
with its producer in order for the title to achieve secondary meaning. 20°
For example, in Litwin v. Maddux, 201 the plaintiff, who published a
novel entitled "The Green Kingdom," failed to establish that the public
associated the title of his work with him as the author. The court, in
denying the plaintiff relief, held that the title of a work would not be
protected unless it could be identified with its source.2"2
The Second Circuit, which follows the New York position, applied
the rule to film titles. The plaintiff in DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 203 suc-
ceeded in establishing that the public identified the "Daily Planet" with
DC Comics as the producer of goods relating to that name. The identifi-
cation was made because the plaintiff was the creator of the comic book
character "Superman" and had used the name the "Daily Planet" in con-
nection with the Superman comic strip for over thirty years. 2" The
plaintiff was thus able to enjoin the defendant from using "Daily Planet"
as the name for its news publication, and therefore prevented the defend-
199. The Lanham Act defines "trademark" as a word, name, or symbol used by a person to
identify his or her goods from those of others, "and to indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1989).
200. "In order to establish a trade-mark, it must be shown that 'the primary significance of
the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product, but the producer.'" Dell
Pub. Co. v. Stanley Pubs., Inc., 211 N.Y.S.2d 393, 402, 9 N.Y.2d 126, 137 (Ct. App. 1961)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown & Bigelow v. Remembrance Adv. Prods., Inc., 279 A.D.
410, 413, 110 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952) aff'd, 304 N.Y. 909, 110 N.E.2d 736
(N.Y. 1953); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)). In Dell, the
court stated that if the public was interested in a romance story written by the plaintiff it would
have no problem in finding the Dell symbol on the corner of the magazine cover. Dell, 211
N.Y.S.2d at 402, 9 N.Y.2d at 137.
201. 7 Misc. 2d 750, 164 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1957).
202. Id. at 757, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (citing Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton & Has-
kins Music Pub. Co., 259 N.Y. 86, 90, 181 N.E. 57, 58 (N.Y. 1932); Underhill v. Schenck, 238
N.Y. 7, 20, 143 N.E. 773, 778 (N.Y. 1924)).
203. 465 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
204. Id. at 845-46.
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ant from capitalizing on the release of plaintiff's upcoming film.2 °5 The
court held that, "the primary significance of the mark in the hands of the
consuming public is not to identify the product, but rather, to identify its
producer."
2 0 6
2. California/Ninth Circuit
Unlike New York courts, California courts do not require that the
title of the work be associated with its author. Rather, secondary mean-
ing can attach to the title itself-absent recognition of the author or pro-
ducer of the work.20 7 Secondary meaning may therefore exist between a
title and a producer who is unknown to the audience.208
In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 209 the plaintiff was dis-
tributing a French film, The Story of 0, 210 based on the book "Histoire
d'O." The title "Histoire d'O" had acquired secondary meaning in
France because of its identification in the public mind with the book.
The defendant mistakenly claimed that the title had to be associated with
its producer or distributor. 211 The court held that the necessary identifi-
cation in the public mind was with, "the literary work, the film, and not
with Allied [the motion picture company] as the distributor."'2 12 The
court found that the segment of society that read such literature associ-
ated the title with the book and as such the title had acquired secondary
meaning.213
The California view in this area is logical, while the New York re-
quirement seems unrealistic. Most people do not know the producer of a
movie or television show, yet are quite familiar with the work itself.
214
205. Id. at 850.
206. Id. at 846.
207. Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 123, 222 P.2d 433, 438 (1950).
208. Jackson, 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433. "Secondary meaning may exist between a
name and the manufacturer or seller whose identity is not known to the buyer.... He [the
buyer] does not know its [the manufacturer's] name, or its location, or whether it is a corpora-
tion or an individual." Id. at 123, 222 P.2d at 438 (alterations and omissions in original)
(citing 1 NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS § 42, at 169-70 (4th ed. 1947)).
209. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
210. Id. at 134, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 98. The title "The Story of 0" is merely the English
translation of "Histoire d'O."
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The court in Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433
(1950), in acknowledging that advertising is concentrated upon the title and the actors, rather
than the author or producer, stated that there was "no logical basis for holding that a public
well acquainted with the title and the play could not confer secondary meaning upon that title
merely because of unfamiliarity with the author's name." Id at 123, 222 P.2d at 438.
[Vol. 10
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
The New York rule may derive from strict trademark law where the
function of a trademark is to denote the product's source rather than the
product itself.2" 5 However, the basic assumption underlying the protec-
tion of literary titles is that each title describes the literary work, rather
than denoting the producer.216 The California approach seems to recog-
nize this assumption and does not require that the producer go through
the rigors of proving that the public recognizes him or her as the source
of the work; instead, the producer must simply prove that the public
associates the title with the product it identifies.
C. Secondary Meaning Factors- What the Court Considers
Courts consider a wide variety of factors when determining whether
a producer has established secondary meaning for his title. In Motown
Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 217 the Second Circuit established the
key factors for determining whether a producer has established secon-
dary meaning. The factors are: (1) the advertising expenditures of the
plaintiff, (2) consumer studies linking the name to its source, (3) the sales
success of the work, (4) unsolicited media coverage, (5) the defendant's
attempt to plagiarize plaintiff's mark, and (6) the length and exclusivity
of the use by the plaintiff.
2 18
Motown involved a dispute concerning the use of the name "Night-
life" for a television show. The plaintiffs were producers of a nationwide
nightly television program, while the defendant was the producer of a
local cable television talk show.2 19 The court found that secondary
meaning had not attached to defendant Cacomm's title, and thus held
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1989).
216. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 10:2, at 324. See infra text accompanying notes 152-62.
217. 668 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'don other grounds, 849 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1988).
218. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 289. The lower court in reaching its decision used the factors
outlined in Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985), cited with
approval in, Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See
also National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974). The National Lampoon court found both evidence of
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion and thus permanently enjoined the defendants
from using the words "National Lampoon" or "Lampoon" as a title for their television show.
In finding strong evidence of secondary meaning the court considered the following facts: (1)
the plaintiff's magazine was distributed throughout North America by 70,000 news dealers
and sold by subscription, (2) the magazine's circulation was 167,000 in 1970 and 100,000 in
1973, (3) plaintiff's revenue from all of its endeavors in 1973 was $6,800,000, (4) the plaintiff's
revue (based on the magazine) was on a national tour and seen by 100,000 people in New York
alone, and by an additional 100,000 people over the country, (5) in November of 1973 plaintiff
had a radio hour broadcasted over 156 stations, (6) plaintiff had produced three records, and
(7) plaintiff was presently producing and taping the revue for broadcast over close circuit tele-
vision. Id. at 738-40.
219. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 287.
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that the defendant had no exclusive right to the name "Nightlife." The
court based its decision on evidence that (1) the defendant's company
had only spent $14,000 on advertising over a one and a half year period,
(2) the defendant had not undertaken a consumer survey which would
indicate the public perception of the program and its source, (3) the de-
fendant performed no survey to show the size of its audience and had no
sales of its show for over one year, (4) the defendant did not offer any
evidence of unsolicited media coverage, (5) the plaintiff's adoption of the
name was not intentional, and finally (6) the length and exclusivity of
defendant's use of the mark was insubstantial since it had sporadically
used the mark for only seven months in 1984 and four months in 1985.220
In Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc. v. Elysium, Inc., 221 a
California court considered the following factors in determining whether
the magazine title Look had achieved secondary meaning: (1) the dura-
tion and continuity of use of the plaintiff's title, (2) the extent of advertis-
ing and promotion of the title and the sums spent therefore, (3) the sales
figures showing the number of people who have purchased plaintiff's
product (proven by the circulation figures of the magazine), and (4) the
identification of the respective markets or marketing area.222 The plain-
tiff had used the name of his magazine, Look, continuously since 1936,
had spent over $49,000,000 in advertising and promotion over a five year
period,2 23 and the circulation of the magazine increased from 5.5 million
copies in 1959 to 7.5 million copies in 1964.224 Although the court found
that secondary meaning had attached to the title, it did not afford the
plaintiff relief because it found that there would be no likelihood of con-
fusion between plaintiff's magazine and the defendant's magazine enti-
tled Nude Look 225
D. Actual Use of the Title and Priority in Time
A crucial factor in determining whether a title is entitled to trade-
mark protection is whether or not the title has been "used. '226 The ra-
220. Id. at 289-90.
221. 255 Cal. App. 2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1967).
222. Id. at 735, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
223. In a single promotional campaign the plaintiff spent between $1,500,000 and
$2,000,000 in advertising Look in various news media throughout the country. Id. at 734, 63
Cal. Rptr. at 509.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 512. See infra text accompanying notes 344-53 for a discus-
sion of the elements necessary to prove likelihood of confusion and thus entitle the claimant to
relief.
226. McCARTHY, supra note 152, § 16:1, at 720.
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tionale for the requirement of use derives from the nature of
trademarks-the value of a trademark is based on the product that it
symbolizes; if there is no use, then nothing is symbolized, and therefore
nothing requires legal protection. 227 The need to prove use came from
federal trademark law which requires that the mark be used in interstate
commerce in order to be registered under federal law.22 8 Common law
protection has incorporated the requirement for use in determining
whether a mark is entitled to trademark protection. However, rather
than use in "interstate commerce,
229 the use must be "public. 23 °
The majority of cases indicate that it is not the exclusiveness of the
producer's use that is important, 231 but rather the acquisition of secon-
dary meaning.232 The length of time the producer uses the title is used
solely as evidence in establishing secondary meaning.233 As will be seen,
even a short period of use may be sufficient.234 Priority in time of the use
of the title is also taken into consideration by courts, probably because of
227. B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS § 2.02, at 31 (1987).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1)(A) (1989). On November 16, 1989 the Trademark Law Revi-
sion Act of 1988 took effect. The previous rule was that trademark protection of a mark was
acquired only if it had been used prior to application for registration. Id. Now, application for
registration can be made prior to actual use of the mark by filing an application based upon a
"bona fide intention" to use the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1989). However, there is a limita-
tion to this provision: the reservation period is limited to six months with extensions up to
three years in certain circumstances. 15 U.S.C. 1063(b)(2)(A) (1989). Because the law just
became effective, cases interpreting these dramatic changes have not yet reached the courts.
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1)(A) (1989).
230. Walt Disney Prods. v. Kusan, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 287 (C.D. Cal. 1979). In
defining what constitutes public use, the Disney court used the First Circuit test adopted in
New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Calif., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1979). The First Circuit
test for determining what constitutes sufficient use of a trademark in order to confer ownership
rights originated in New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir.
1951):
[Tihe question of use adequate to establish appropriation remains one to be decided
on the facts of each case, and that evidence showing, first, adoption, and second, use
in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appro-
priate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark, is competent
to establish ownership, even without evidence of actual sales.
New West, 595 F.2d at 1200 (emphasis omitted) (citing New England Duplicating Co. v.
Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 1951)). The New West court found that the totality of the
plaintiff's acts met the "public identification" requirement of the First Circuit rule and thus
gave the plaintiff the right to use the name "New West" for the title of its magazine. Id. at
1200-01.
231. But see the federal Lanham Act which allows as prima facie evidence of secondary
meaning the exclusive and continuous use of a mark for five years preceding an offer of proof
by the applicant. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1989).
232. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 15:9, at 682.
233. Id., § 15:20, at 701.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 263-67.
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its certainty and predictability.235 Courts, however, are divided as to
whether priority of use is a requirement for establishing ownership of a
mark.236 Some courts apply the priority of use rule strictly, while others
consider the equities involved.
2 37
1. New York/Second Circuit
The New York position on the amount of use required is enunciated
in DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers: 238
In order to claim ownership of a mark, a party must demon-
strate that his use of the mark has been of such a quality and for
such a duration that it has come to identify goods bearing it as
originating from that party. In short, the mark must have de-
veloped a secondary meaning.
239
In DC Comics, the plaintiffs and their predecessors had used the
title, "Daily Planet" in connection with their "Superman" character
since 1938.2' The "Daily Planet" played a key role in the development
of both the "Superman" story and of the "Superman" character. 24 The
title was used both as the name of the newspaper which employed Clark
Kent and also as the title of a promotional news column appearing
within the Superman comic books.2 42 The defendants, on the other
hand, used the title "The Daily Planet" in connection with their local
underground newspaper which was published only irregularly during the
years 1969 through 1973.243 After 1973, the defendants ceased produc-
tion of the newspaper until it learned of the plaintiff's upcoming release
of the Superman motion picture. 24" The court found that the plaintiff's
use of the title was of such a duration and consistency that ownership
235. B. PAITrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS § 2.03, at 40 (1987). See also supra
text accompanying notes 226-30 for a discussion of the importance of priority of use in regard
to traditional trademarks.
236. Compare Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 135, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 94, 98 (1977), with Walt Disney Prods. v. Kusan, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 286
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
237. See B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS § 2.03, at 42 (1987).
238. 465 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
239. Id. at 846 (emphasis added). See also Sterling Prods. Corp. v. Sterling Prods., Inc., 45
F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) where the court held that in order to acquire secondary mean-
ing, the "[p]laintiff must demonstrate that these words have been used exclusively for many
years and to such an extent that they are commonly associated with the plaintiff and plaintiff's
business." Id. at 961.
240. DC Comics, 465 F. Supp. at 845.
241. Id. at 847.
242. Id. at 845.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 847.
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had been established.24 The defendants' use, however, showed an intent
to abandon and thus the defendants did not own the title.246
a. Priority in Time
The general rule in New York is that acquisition of secondary mean-
ing, rather than priority of use, is a necessary condition for protection
against title infringement.247 In Frohman v. William Morris, Inc., 248 the
defendant argued that it owned the title "Chanticlair" because its bur-
lesque was produced prior to the production of plaintiffs' play,
"Chantecler." 249 However, the fact that Rostand had written the plain-
tiff's play25° and was about to produce it in Europe was well known to
the public for years prior to defendant's production. 21  The court stated
that, "it should [not] be held that the one who was prior in time of actu-
ally producing something ... is stronger in right. In equity the right
belongs to the eminent author whose talent and reputation created the
extraordinary interest of which the defendants ... have sought to reap
the benefit."
25 2
Another example of this rule can be found in the Second Circuit
case of Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 253 where the defend-
ant, Cacomm, argued that it had the exclusive right to use the name
"Nightlife" for its television show since it was the prior user of the
245. DC Comics, 465 F. Supp. at 847.
246. Id. at 848. See infra text accompanying notes 466-88 for a discussion of what consti-
tutes abandonment of a title.
247. Schwartz v. Hampton, 30 Misc. 2d 837, 839, 219 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1961), aff'd, 16
A.D.2d 915, 230 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1962); Litwin v. Maddux, 7 Misc. 2d 750, 761, 164 N.Y.S.2d
489, 500 (1957) (citing Underhill v. Schenck, 114 Misc. 520, 524, 187 N.Y.S. 589, 592, modi-
fied and aff'd, 201 A.D. 46, 193 N.Y.S. 745 (1921); Frohman v. William Morris, Inc., 68 Misc.
461, 465, 123 N.Y.S. 1090, 1093 (1910)).
248. 68 Misc. 461, 123 N.Y.S. 1090 (1910).
249. Defendant acquired the United States rights to its burlesque from persons in Europe.
Id. at 463, 123 N.Y.S. at 1091.
250. Plaintiff had acquired the right from Rostand to produce the play in English in the
United States. Id. at 462, 123 N.Y.S. at 1090.
251. Id. at 465, 123 N.Y.S. at 1092.
252. Id. at 465, 123 N.Y.S. at 1093. See also Children's Television Workshop v. Sesame
Nursery Centers, Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). The plaintiff in Chil-
dren's Television Workshop, produced the television series Sesame Street. The producer sought
a temporary injunction against the defendants' further use of the name "Sesame" for their day
care services (the defendants intended on franchising their operation based upon the commer-
cial success of plaintiff's television show). The defendants claimed that they were the prior
user of "Sesame" in connection with pre-school education and day care services. The court
decided, however, that even if defendants had used the name prior to plaintiff, defendants' use
was limited and thus did not give defendants the right "to expand their operations into new
fields and areas on plaintiff's coattails." Id. at 105.
253. 668 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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name.254 Cacomm first produced its show in January 1984, while the
plaintiff's, Motown's, show premiered in September 1986. The court
stated that, "[ p]rior use of a trademark does not automatically entitle the
first user to bar its use by others,"255 and held for the plaintiff. The court
further stated that it must not look solely to the age of the marks in
question, but also to other factors.256
Although Thomas Nelson, Inc. v. Cherish Books Ltd. 257 implies that
by virtue of a party's first use of a mark in commerce it is the owner of
the trademark,258 it cannot be read as meaning that one who is prior in
time is automatically prior in right. In Thomas Nelson, the plaintiff, who
published a series of Christian romance novels under the name "Cherish
Romances," sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing its series of
romance novels under the title "Cherish Romance." The defendant con-
ceived the name "Cherish Romance" and began soliciting orders for its
novels in September 1983. By December 1983, defendant received an
order for 150,000 volumes and in March 1984 the first printing of the
novels commenced. In April 1984, defendant filed an application with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office for registration of its
mark. By the end of July 1984, over 240,000 novels were distributed
throughout the United States and sold to the public by major retail
stores. As well, defendant spent over $150,000 in the publication and
marketing of its books.259
The plaintiff also conceived of its name "Cherish Romances" in Sep-
tember 1983, and in October 1983 it conducted a search to determine if
the mark was available. In November 1983, plaintiff announced, in a
company newsletter, its adoption of the name for a series of novels. In
April 1984 plaintiff commenced pre-publication sales of its books and in
254. See supra text accompanying notes 217-20 for a more extensive discussion of the facts
of the case.
255. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 290 (citing Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580
F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979)). See also American Footwear
Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979). In reversing the injunction
granted by the district court, the Second Circuit in American Footwear stated that, "mere fact
of seniority alone does not entitle the first user of trademark to injunctive relief. The determi-
nation is to be made on the basis of the equities involved, and thereby requires an evaluation of
the legitimate interest of the senior user, the junior user and the consuming public." Id. at 664.
256. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 290 (citing Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580
F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979)). See supra text accompanying
notes 217-20 for a discussion of the "other factors" to which the court was referring.
257. 595 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
258. Id. at 991. See also WGBH Educ. Found., Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 453 F. Supp.
1347, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (since the plaintiff was the prior user of the mark it would ordina-
rily be entitled to the protection that it sought).
259. Thomas Nelson, 595 F. Supp. at 990.
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July 1984 began to distribute the first novel of its series. Over 60,000
copies were sold as of the date of trial (October 1984).2"
The court found that the defendant was the owner of the mark since
its first use in commerce was in March of 1984 when it printed the
novels, and plaintiff's first use was not until July of 1984 when it distrib-
uted the first novel of its series.2 6 1 Although the Thomas Nelson decision
seems contrary to the rule stated in Motown, it can be reconciled. The
Thomas Nelson court, in reaching its decision, impliedly considered facts
relating to the defendant's use of the title, other than the mere priority of
use, and in balancing the equities, the court found that the defendant
should prevail.262
2. California/Ninth Circuit
The general rule in California is exemplified in Jackson v. Universal
International Pictures, Inc., 263 where the plaintiff's play, "Slightly Scan-
dalous," was rehearsed in Los Angeles, had a two week run in Philadel-
phia consisting of fifteen performances, and was performed in New York
only seven times. 264 Although the duration of the use of the title was not
extensive, the court found that secondary meaning had attached to the
play's title. The court indicated that an accurate test to measure the du-
ration of use required to create secondary meaning did not exist,265 but
that no particular time period of use of the title was required.266 The
court further pointed out that, although prior decisions indicated that the
title must be used long and exclusively by one producer with reference to
his work, "the essence of the acquisition of secondary meaning is the
impact upon the public mind.
'267
Comparing DC Comics 2 68 with Jackson, there does not seem to be
260. Id. at 991.
261. Id.
262. The other factors that the court considered were the advertising expenditures of the
defendant, the extent of the distribution of defendant's novel, and the amount of novels sold.
Id. at 990-91.
263. 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950).
264. Id. at 118-19, 222 P.2d at 434-35.
265. Id. at 123, 222 P.2d at 437 (citing 1 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS
§ 38a, at 162 (4th ed. 1947)).
266. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437.
267. Id. at 123, 222 P.2d at 437 (citing 1 NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS
§ 38a, at 162 (4th ed. 1947)). See also Colvig v. KSFO, 224 Cal. App. 2d 357, 36 Cal. Rptr.
701 (1964) where the court stated that, "[a] name or designation has a secondary meaning
when it has been used so long or in such a way that the public has come to associate it with the
person using it ...." Id. at 368, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
268. 465 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra text accompanying notes 240-46 for a
discussion of this case.
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any difference in what is required for use in New York as compared to
California. Both jurisdictions require an amount of use sufficient for the
title to acquire secondary meaning. Although the plaintiff in DC Comics
used its title much more extensively than the plaintiff in Jackson, in ap-
propriate cases, New York courts similarily have found that two months
is an adequate period of use to acquire secondary meaning.269
a. Priority in Time
California courts reach different results when confronted with "pri-
ority of use"-state courts consider other factors involved, while the
Ninth Circuit applies the rule strictly. In the California state court case
of Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 270 the defendant's film, The
Journey of 0, was released in the United States in August 1975, prior to
the release of the plaintiff's film, The Story of 0, in November 1975.271
However, in ruling that "[p]riority of use of a title does not of itself cre-
ate a secondary meaning, ' 2 72 the court did not find for the defendant.
The court concluded that the plaintiff had acquired secondary meaning
in its title273 and accordingly granted it relief.
269. Hemingway v. Film Alliance of the United States, 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827
(1940) (Plaintiff's play was performed from March 5th to May 18th).
270. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
271. However the activities from those whom the plaintiff acquired his rights occurred prior
to the actions of the defendant: the novel "Histoire d'O" was published in France in the early
1950's, the English translation of the novel, "The Story of 0," had been widely distributed in
the United States since 1965, and the movie based on the novel was released in France in early
1975. Id. at 131, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96. It may thus be said that the plaintiff's use was prior in
time to the defendant's if one counted the activities of plaintiff's predecessors in interest.
272. Allied Artists, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 135, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (citing Gordon v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 37-38, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499, 503 (1969)). In Gordon,
the court found that the lower court's failure to instruct the jury that "mere priority of use
does not create secondary meaning" was prejudicial error. Gordon, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 37-38,
74 Cal. Rptr. at 503. See also Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 118 (1971) where the court stated that "[mlere priority of use does not create or establish
a 'secondary meaning' for a title." Id. at 237, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
273. "It is unimportant that the secondary meaning resulted from the activities of persons
other than Allied. The critical question is whether the secondary meaning had been estab-
lished in the public mind and not the precise manner in which it was created." Allied Artists,
68 Cal. App. 3d at 135, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (citing Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36
Cal. 2d 116, 123, 222 P.2d 433, 437 (1950); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 212 Cal. App.
2d 23, 30, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837 (1963); United Artists Corp. v. Exodus Motion Picture
Corp., 26 Misc. 2d 807, 808, 207 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (1960)). The Allied Artists court found
secondary meaning in that the French version of the movie was widely advertised, reviewed
and distributed in France; the English version of the book was widely distributed in the United
States; the plaintiff had paid $400,000 for the distribution rights to the movie which was well
received and attended; and the plaintiff had spent $250,000 in advertising and planned to
spend another $1,500,000 for future advertising. Id. at 131-32, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97.
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The Ninth Circuit reaches a markedly different result than Califor-
nia state courts. In Walt Disney Productions v. Kusan, Inc., 274 the plain-
tiff acquired the trademark and rights associated with a board game
entitled "The Black Hole" to be used as part of its merchandising plan in
connection with the release of its film of the same title.27' Disney's pred-
ecessor in interest had previously shipped the game all over the United
States in September 1978.276 The plaintiff's film, The Black Hole, was
heavily advertised from October 1978 until its release date of December
1979. Defendant, who owned a board game called "Black Hole in
Space," shipped a prototype of its game in interstate commerce to its
representatives in April 1978.277 In both September and October 1978,
defendant was put on notice of plaintiff's intended use of the name for its
board game.27 In April 1979, after receiving plaintiff's March 1979
cease and desist letter, the defendant shipped its game in interstate com-
merce to establish priority of use.2 79
Although defendant's use of the name "Black Hole in Space" for its
board game was seemingly prior to plaintiff's, the court held that the
defendant's use of the name was not public and therefore was not prior to
the plaintiff's first public use of its name.28 0 The court stated that a "first
user of trademark has a prior legal right in that mark and may therefore
prevent subsequent users from employing a similar mark which is likely
to cause public confusion. 28 1 The court further qualified this rule by
stating that substantially greater use does not entitle the party to an in-
junction if its use was not prior in time.282
Comparing New York and the Second Circuit with California and
the Ninth Circuit, it is almost impossible to reconcile the cases, or estab-
lish a clear rule. As was previously stated, 283 courts are split-not neces-
sarily by jurisdiction-as to whether priority of use is a requirement. It
may be that courts use the rule merely to bolster the acquisition of secon-
274. 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
275. Id. at 285.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 286. There was an article in Playthings magazine announcing the forthcoming
availability of the Disney game, as well as a Los Angeles Times newspaper clipping concerning
the plaintiff's movie. Disney, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 286.
279. Id. at 286.
280. Id. at 287. See supra note 230 for a discussion of what constitutes "public use."
281. Id. at 286. See also New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1979) where the court stated that the defendant had the right to use the trademark be-
cause of its prior use of the mark in interstate commerce.
282. Disney, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 288.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 231-37.
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dary meaning in an already strong case;2 84 or, priority of use may simply
be a way to establish who owns a title when both parties have established
secondary meaning in their titles through other factors.
E Advertising
Advertising serves a dual function in the establishment of secondary
meaning. First, it is a factor that the court considers in evaluating
whether a title has acquired secondary meaning28.-5it is a vehicle by
which the producer creates an impression in the public mind that the title
belongs to him. Second, advertising can create the use necessary for pro-
tection of one's mark. Evidence of the amount of money spent by the
producer in advertising his or her title is relevant, yet not conclusive, in
determining secondary meaning.286 If one has spent a lot of money,
courts may infer that the title of the work has become associated in the
public mind with its source, yet this is not always true. 287 The nature
and extent of advertising is important because a nationwide advertising
campaign will expose a greater number of people to the title, while a local
advertisement may attract only a few people.
288
1. New York/Second Circuit
In Brown v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 289 the court enjoined the defendants
from using the title "Sex and the Single Man" as the title to their movie,
because the plaintiffs had embarked on an extensive and costly advertis-
ing and promotional campaign publicizing their movie, Sex and the Sin-
gle Girl, based on their book of the same name.29" The court, however,
284. See generally Thomas Nelson, Inc. v. Cherish Books Ltd., 595 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
285. See generally Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 197 F. Supp. 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) where the plaintiff had spent over $6,000,000 in advertising its magazine
Atlantic Monthly between 1927 and 1960, and from 1950 to date, the annual amount spent in
advertising averaged $250,000. In Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) the title "Frank Merriwell" had acquired secondary meaning, in part because
of the wide advertisement of the name, costing in total $500,000, by means of circulars, book-
lets, display pictures and prize contests. Likewise, in Klaw v. General Film Co., 154 N.Y.S.
988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), 156 N.Y.S. 1128 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1915), the court found secondary
meaning because of more than four years of extensive advertising in association with the plain-
tiff's play "A Fool There Was."
286. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 15:19, at 699.
287. Id.,
288. Id.,
289. 42 Misc. 2d 909, 249 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1964).
290. See generally Amusement Sec. Corp. v. Academy Pictures Distrib. Corp., 162 Misc.
608, 294 N.Y.S. 279 (1936), modified & aff'd, 251 A.D. 227, 295 N.Y.S. 436 (N.Y. App. Div.
1937) (the title "Zombie" acquired secondary meaning because large sums of money spent by
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denied plaintiffs' request for an injunction against publication of defend-
ants' book with that title for two reasons: (1) the defendants had also
spent large sums of money in publishing and advertising their book and
(2) the court determined that the plaintiffs had already benefitted from
sales of the book "Sex and the Single Girl." 
291
Although advertising helps to establish secondary meaning, the
court in Litwin v. Maddux 292 reached a different result. The plaintiff in
Litwin spent time and money to advertise his book, "The Green King-
dom," yet the court stated that
[a] secondary meaning comes gradually and the Court does not
think that it can be acquired overnight by intensive advertising,
and mere advertising over a period of time is insufficient to
show that a secondary meaning had been acquired, since the
criterion is the achievement of a result rather than the effort
expended to achieve the result.293
Plaintiff was not granted an injunction because the court doubted that
the title, "The Green Kingdom," was adequately advertised over an ap-
propriate period of time to associate it, in the public mind, with the
plaintiff's book.2 94 Because this case was decided when the methods of
advertising were not as sophisticated as they are today, it cannot be given
much weight in this regard. In today's society, where it may only take
days or weeks of advertising to saturate the public mind with the title of
the work, secondary meaning may come more quickly than is indicated
in Litwin.
a Pre-release Advertising
The Second Circuit held that even pre-release advertising may be
sufficient to give a title secondary meaning.295 In Orion Pictures Co. v.
plaintiff in advertising and promoting the picture caused it to be a big box office and financial
success).
291. Brown, 42 Misc. 2d at 912, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
292. 7 Misc. 2d 750, 164 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1957).
293. Id. at 761, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (citing DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.,
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936)).
294. Id. at 761, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
295. "[E]ven if the work has not been released, a sufficient amount of pre[-]release publicity
of the title may cause the title to acquire recognition sufficient for protection." Orion Pictures
Co. v. Dell Pub. Co., 471 F. Supp. 392, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing 1 J.T. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:4, at 277 (1973)). But see, Walt Disney
Prods., Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 192 F.2d
856 (2d Cir. 1951) where the court implied that the expenditure of great sums of money in
production and advertising was not sufficient to give a title secondary meaning and thus gave
producers no right to enjoin a movie under the same title which was produced by the defend-
1990]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
Dell Publishing Co., 296 the plaintiff embarked on an extensive pre-release
campaign, total expenditures estimated at $4,000,000, to give the movie
title A Little Romance secondary meaning. The defendant acquired the
English translation and publication rights to the French book upon
which the plaintiff's movie was based. The book was originally titled
"'E=MC2, Mon Amour," however the defendant changed the title to "A
Little Romance" after learning that the plaintiff intended to release its
film under this name.297 The plaintiff and defendant attempted to ar-
range a tie-in agreement between the release of the book and the movie,
yet were unsuccessful because plaintiff's screenplay was no longer similar
to the book due to rewriting and alterations in the storyline of the film.29
Defendant, nonetheless, continued with its use of the title, "A Little Ro-
mance," and even stated on the cover of the novel, "NOW A MAJOR
MOTION PICTURE.
299
The court enjoined the defendant from further use of the title or
other representations which stated a greater relationship between the
plaintiff's movie and the defendant's book than actually existed."°° The
court also found that even if secondary meaning had not been firmly es-
tablished, this would not prevent relief because "secondary meaning 'in
the making' should be protected, at least to the extent of preventing in-
tentional attempts . . . to capitalize on the efforts and goodwill of
others.""'' Although this concept of "secondary meaning in the mak-
ing" does not seem consistent with the rule that secondary meaning must
be established prior to protection, it may be dismissed as merely dictum
because the court in Orion noted that the plaintiff's title had, in fact,
acquired secondary meaning.30 2
ants at less expense and which was less widely advertised. Walt Disney, 98 F. Supp. at 775.
The court seemingly based this decision on the fact that the copyright to the book "Alice in
Wonderland" had expired and therefore the work was in the public domain and could not
acquire secondary meaning. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, even with the assump-
tion that words in the public domain could acquire secondary meaning, because the plaintiffs
had failed to prove secondary meaning had attached to their work. Walt Disney, 192 F.2d at
857-58.
296. 471 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
297. Id. at 393.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 394.
300. Id. at 397.
301. Orion, 471 F. Supp. at 396.
302. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 15:21, at 704-06. The Seventh Circuit specifically dis-
approved of the idea of "secondary meaning in the making" in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 999 (7th Cir. 1989). But see Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v.
Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nor. Metro Kane Im-
ports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986) where the courts noted the approval
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In Willpat Productions, Inc. v. Sigma III Corp., 303 a different deci-
sion was reached. The plaintiff in Willpat advertised the title to its
movie, Thundering Wheels, only during the filming of the movie at At-
lanta International Raceway in late 1962. The movie was scheduled for
release in the spring of 1964, after the issue of secondary meaning was
determined at trial. The court found that this pre-release advertising was
insufficient to create secondary meaning. 3" The court did not hold that
pre-release advertising in general was insufficient to create secondary
meaning, only that the plaintiff in this case had failed to establish the
necessary association in the public mind by reason of its meager
advertising.
2. California/Ninth Circuit
The California court in Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 305 relied heavily on advertising as a factor in the development of
secondary meaning in a title."°  In that case, the plaintiff spent
$14,669.71 during a two year period advertising the title to his book,
"Queen of the Flat Tops. ' 30 7 The court, citing a long list of cases that
considered advertising as a method of proving secondary meaning,
30 8
found that the plaintiff's title had acquired secondary meaning.30 9
a. Pre-release Advertising
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 310 the plaintiffs were produ-
cers of a movie entitled The Wonderful World of the Brothers Grimm.
The defendants were using this title as an element of their advertising
campaign for their movie, Grimm's Fairy Tales. The plaintiffs' title was
widely advertised in newspapers, magazines, and trade journals through-
out the United States. 311 The court found that, because of plaintiffs' ex-
tensive pre-release advertising campaign, the film title, The Wonderful
World of the Brothers Grimm, had acquired secondary meaning even
the doctrine has received by other Second Circuit courts. If a court would even consider this
doctrine, it must be noted that the plaintiff will have to prove that the defendant's actions were
intentional in order to have a chance of being afforded relief when there is "secondary meaning
in the making."
303. 227 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
304. Id. at 356.
305. 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (1947).
306. Id. at 811, 187 P.2d at 483.
307. Id. at 800, 187 P.2d at 477.
308. Id. at 811, 187 P.2d at 483.
309. Id. at 813, 187 P.2d at 485.
310. 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1963).
311. Id. at 26, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
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though the film itself was not yet completed.3 12 The court stated that
"[u]se of another's advertising and publicity developments in a mislead-
ing manner is no less unfair than adopting a title or trademark which has
come to be associated with its first user or his product, and accordingly is
afforded protection within the law of unfair competition."3 3
There are no apparent inconsistencies between New York and Cali-
fornia in the courts' treatment of advertising and its effect on secondary
meaning. A producer should advertise his or her title both prior to re-
lease of the work, and while it is being shown either in the theaters or on
television. As most are quite aware, in today's society we are inundated
with advertisements for movies which have scheduled releases months in
advance. The advertisement for the movie Back to the Future H illus-
trates this concept perfectly: for months prior to the film's release, the
campaign featured a billboard on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles which
had a digital clock counting down the hours, minutes, and seconds until
the film's opening, thus capturing the public's attention and securing the
title in the public's mind.
F Publicity- Unsolicited Media Coverage
Courts consider unsolicited media coverage as another factor in de-
termining whether a title has become associated in the public mind with
its source.3" 4 Unsolicited media coverage is an important factor because
it indicates that the title is getting some recognition, though the efforts
are not directly attributable to the producer.
1. New York/Second Circuit
In Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 315 the court found that the
amount of unsolicited media coverage presented was insufficient to find
consumer association of the title, "Fort Apache," with the plaintiff as
author.316 The plaintiff wrote an autobiographical book entitled "Fort
Apache" concerning his experiences patrolling the streets of the South
312. Id. at 30, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
313. Id.
314. See generally Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1977) where the court found because of the publicity that the French film had re-
ceived in France and the United States (reviewed in major publications) and the massive adver-
tising campaign that the plaintiff had embarked on ($250,000 spent in advertising to date and
$1,500,000 for future advertising) that the title "The Story of 0" had acquired secondary
meaning. Id. at 132, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
315. 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 44, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159
(1986).
316. Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 440.
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Bronx. The defendants produced a film entitled Fort Apache, the Bronx
which was a fictional account of a police officer's search for the killer of
two other members of his precinct. As evidence of unsolicited media
coverage, the plaintiff offered three isolated, insignificant, and in one case
unrelated, newspaper articles which credited him as the author of both
the book and the film.
3 17
A like result was reached in Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm,
Inc., 318 where the court considered, as one of the factors in determin-
ing secondary meaning, the unsolicited media coverage of the defendant's
title, "Nightlife." However, the court found that the evidence
presented-three items which were the result of a press release put out
on defendant's behalf-occurring twenty-one months prior to the airing
of plaintiff's television show, was inadequate to show that secondary
meaning was acquired.319
2. California/Ninth Circuit
In Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc., 320the California
Supreme Court recognized that even negative publicity could create sec-
ondary meaning in a title.321 In addition to the publicity in large circula-
tion magazines and newspapers, which was the result of efforts by
plaintiff's press agent, the play, "Slightly Scandalous," received unfavor-
able reviews by drama critics. 322 For example, in New York, the play
was publicized in ten newspapers, and was criticized by all. Agreeing
with the plaintiff's assertion that although a play is unpopular or disliked
by the critics, the title can become imbedded in the minds of the public
due to the unfavorable comments it has received,3 23 the court found that
the title had obtained secondary meaning. 32 4 The court stated that a lit-
erary title need not be popular to acquire secondary meaning, "because
notoriety and adverse discussion may bring about widespread identifica-
tion of the play by its title and may pique the public interest. '325
In a Ninth Circuit case, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Em-
bassy Pictures, 326 the plaintiff, owner of the copyright to the movie Blue
317. Id.
318. 668 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'don other grounds, 849 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1988).
319. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 289.
320. 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950).
321. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437.
322. Id. at 119, 222 P.2d at 435.
323. Id. at 121, 222 P.2d at 436.
324. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437.
325. Jackson, 36 Cal. 2d at 122, 222 P.2d at 437.
326. 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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Lagoon, sought to enjoin the advertising of defendant's film Paradise.327
The court found that reviews by movie critics, commenting on the simi-
larity of the advertising for the two films, were insufficient to prove that
plaintiff's print advertisement had achieved secondary meaning.328
Both California and New York courts recognize that secondary
meaning can be achieved, in part, because of unsolicited media coverage
of the work, or its title. As a general rule, the exposure must not be
sought out by the producer-it must be "unsolicited." The issue is how
much coverage is required. According to Walker, Motown, and Colum-
bia Pictures, a few reviews, or comments made in newspapers or
magazines, are probably not sufficient. However, the reviews need not be
favorable, as was demonstrated by Jackson. Thus, a producer should
present evidence of any unsolicited press coverage in his or her attempt
to prove that the title has acquired an identification with its source in the
public mind.
G. Segment of the Population-Does Size Matter?
The segment of the population familiar with the producer's title is
an important factor in determining secondary meaning. The public's fa-
miliarity with the title-and not that of people in the entertainment in-
dustry-is considered.329 The size of the segment of the public that must
recognize the work as that of the claimant has not been precisely defined.
Generally, courts consider the branch of the purchasing public familiar
with the plaintiff's trade.33°
1. New York/Second Circuit
In Hemingway v. Film Alliance of the United States, Inc., 331 the
plaintiffs succeeded in preventing the defendants from using "Fifth Col-
umn Squad" as the title for their movie. The plaintiffs' play, "The Fifth
Column," only played in New York for two months. Nonetheless, the
court found that the title had acquired secondary meaning.332 The court
identified the requisite segment of the population that must be familiar
with the plaintiffs' play title as the "theatre-going public., 333 Thus, it
327. Id. at 497. The plaintiff's claims were based on copyright infringement, trademark
dilution, and unfair competition. Id.
328. Id. at 500.
329. Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
279, 289 (1979).
330. Id. at 289.
331. 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1940).
332. Id. at 726, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
333. Id.
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was only necessary for those people who went to the theater to identify
the title with the plaintiff's work, such that this group would believe that
a motion picture with a similar title was based on the play.334
2. California/Ninth Circuit
Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc. "' is a California
Supreme Court case in which secondary meaning was proven, although
only a small number of people actually saw the plaintiff's work. In Jack-
son, only about 3,750 people saw the plaintiff's play. Yet, the court
found this small segment of the public sufficient in determining whether
the title, "Slightly Scandalous," had acquired secondary meaning.336
The court stated that "[t]he precise size of this segment of the public...
does not determine whether the title has acquired a secondary mean-
ing., 337 The court further refined the phrase "segment of the popula-
tion" by stating that in using the word "public" the court did not mean
all or most of the people of a place, but as many which would distinguish
them from a few.338
As long as a producer can show that there is an audience who asso-
ciates the title with its source, he or she has satisfied the "segment of the
population" requirement. This audience must consist of members of the
public who attend the movies or watch television.
339
II. SUMMARY OF SECONDARY MEANING
The New York/Second Circuit requirements for protection of a sin-
gle literary title can be summarized as: (1) the public must associate the
work with its producer, (2) the use of the title must be continuous, (3)
priority of the use of the title is not important, (4) a sufficient amount of
pre-release advertising can create secondary meaning, (5) unsolicited me-
334. Id.
335. 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950).
336. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437. The court also noted that although only this amount of
people saw the play, this did not necessarily account for those who saw the advertising and
read the reviews. Id.
337. Id., cited with approval in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., v. Lee, 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27
Cal. Rptr. 833 (1963).
338. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437 (citing Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayley Bros., Inc., 12 Cal. 2d
501, 514, 86 P.2d 102, 108 (1939)). See also Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal.
App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977) where the segment of the population that needed to
associate "The Story of 0" with the book it entitled was "[t]hat element of United States
society that reads such material." Id. at 134, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
339. See Fishler v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 159 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Cal.
1958). Only people who associated the title "Virgin Queen" with plaintiff's play were the
plaintiffs and their agents. Id.
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dia coverage of the title can be used as evidence of secondary meaning,
and (6) the segment of the population that must identify the work with
its producer is that group which is familiar with the producer's trade.
The general requirements for protection of a single literary title in
California/Ninth Circuit are: (1) the public must identify the title with
the work it names, (2) the duration of use of the title need only be suffi-
cient for the title to apquire secondary meaning, (3) priority of use of the
title is not a requirement in state courts, yet is a necessity in federal
courts, (4) pre-release advertising of the title can be used as evidence of
secondary meaning, (5) negative publicity can create secondary meaning,
and (6) the segment of the population that must associate the title with
the work can be relatively small.
Although secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion 340 are sep-
arate issues, courts often consider them together. If the public is con-
fused as to the source of the title, it must follow that the title has
acquired secondary meaning. 341 The converse is also true-there would
be no confusion if there was no secondary meaning because the public
would not be familiar with the source of the title in the first place. Thus,
it is possible that one could use proof of public confusion as to source as
evidence of secondary meaning.34 2 The next section discusses how one
can prove "likelihood of confusion" and thus prevent another producer
from using a title that is protected-or contrarily, how a producer can
show that there is no confusion and thus be able to use a title similar to
one already in existence.
Lisa E. Socransky
340. See infra text accompanying notes 520-34 for a discussion of what is needed to prove
infringement of a protected title.
341. MCCARTHY, supra note 152, § 15:3, at 666.
342. An example of how courts combine the two issues can be seen in their treatment of the
intent of the "wrongdoer." Most courts consider the intent of the alleged infringer in regard to
likelihood of confusion, but the court in National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974) stated that "[d]eliberate
'passing off' is not only evidence of likelihood of confusion, but of secondary meaning as well."
National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 747 (citing Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F.
Supp. 1288, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)), cited with approval in, Orion Pictures Co. v. Dell Pub. Co.,
471 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Orion court stated that "it is clear from the defend-
ant's own... advertising... that the defendant was counting on the plaintiff's publicity as the
primary means by which to promote the sale of the book." Orion Pictures, 471 F. Supp. at 396.
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PART III: LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Unfair competition has been called "the child of confusion." '343 It
earned this epithet because likelihood of confusion plays an important
role in determining the outcome of an action based on unfair competi-
tion. Courts repeatedly recognize the interdependence between the ele-
ments of likelihood of confusion and secondary meaning, which the
plaintiff must prove to get relief in most jurisdictions. 3"
Although likelihood of confusion and secondary meaning may be
difficult to distinguish, they are two separate legal issues.345 Likelihood
of confusion refers to a situation where "the public will be misled into
believing that defendants' work originated or is associated with or spon-
sored by plaintiff because both works bear the same title." '346 Titles
which are similar, although not identical may cause confusion and have
also received protection.347 When a title acquires secondary meaning,
confusion is more likely to exist.348 "Secondary meaning is a shorthand
phrase which describes the existence of conditions from which public
confusion will flow if the defendant is permitted to pursue his deceptive
scheme.
, 34 9
As will be illustrated, likelihood of confusion is essential to a claim
for unfair competition. The Restatement of Torts lists the following fac-
tors to consider in determining if likelihood of confusion exists:
(a) the degree of similarity between the product of the plaintiff
and the defendant in
i) appearance;
ii) pronunciation of words used;
iii) verbal translation or pictures [ ] involved;
iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the
343. Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 203, 139 S.E.2d 185,
188 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1964).
344. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 30, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833,
837 (1963).
345. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
346. Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
347. See generally Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1977); Brown v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 249 N.Y.S. 2d 370, 42 Misc. 2d 909 (1964).
348. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 30, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
349. Id.
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goods or services marketed by the actor and those marketed by
the other; [and]
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.35 °
The factors listed in the Restatement of Torts have been tailored for
application to literary title protection. While courts place varying impor-
tance on specific "likelihood of confusion" factors when determining
whether a competing title is likely to cause confusion, certain guidelines
are available to the producer when choosing a title for his movie. In
order to establish likelihood of confusion, the producer must look to the
familiarity of the public with a specific title, not that of experts in his
field. 35 ' To obtain damages, a producer must show that consumers have
actually been confused by the defendant's use of the title. However, to
obtain equitable relief a producer must simply show likelihood of confu-
sion or deception; 35 2 he does not have to show that consumers have in
fact been confused by defendant's choice of title.
353
A. Actual Confusion
Actual confusion refers to incidents whereby the public is unable to
distinguish between the products of the plaintiff and of the defendant.
354
When the public associates a film title with a particular work, the use of
the same or a similar title in connection with a different work may make
it difficult to differentiate the two works. When one work is in fact mis-
taken for the other, there is actual confusion.
1. The Second Circuit/New York
In the 1980 case, DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates, 3 the
Second Circuit affirmed its longstanding rule that when the plaintiff seeks
damages he must be able to show actual confusion between his product
and defendant's. In that case, the court held that a "plaintiff cannot re-
cover damages without proof that consumers who wished to buy plain-
tiff's product were actually misled into buying defendant's, or at least
that consumers were actually confused as to the origin of the
350. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
351. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 291, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
352. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981).
353. Id.
354. See generally Amusement Sec. Corp. v. Academy Pictures Distrib. Corp., 294 N.Y.S.
279 (1936); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 144, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1977).
355. 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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products.,
356
In DC Comics, the defendant created an animated television series
featuring characters similar to characters marketed by the plaintiff in its
own comic books-Aquaman and Plastic Man. Although the plaintiff
proved likelihood of consumer confusion, actual confusion was not
proved.357 The plaintiff testified that a woman told him that her children
enjoyed watching his new show, indicating her confused belief that plain-
tiff produced defendant's show. However, the court stated that a single
isolated incident was not enough to show actual confusion of the viewing
public in general, or of the audience for comic books.3 58 The fact that
the plaintiff was trying to obtain damages as opposed to equitable relief
was an important consideration in the outcome of this case. When a
plaintiff seeks equitable relief, his chances for attaining a favorable judg-
ment may increase where an incident of actual confusion is shown.35 9
In Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Pictures Distributing
Corp., " the plaintiff produced a film entitled White Zombie and sought
an injunction against the defendants' exhibition of their film entitled Re-
volt of the Zombies. The court held that the presence of the word "Zom-
bie" in both titles was likely to cause confusion.36' In support of its
holding, the court noted, among other things, 362 an instance of actual
confusion. 363 "In fact, one newspaper commentator actually referred to
defendants' picture as 'White Zombie' ,3 instead of "Revolt of the
Zombies." Although this was only an isolated instance, the actual confu-
sion supported the claim for likelihood of confusion. Because the plain-
tiff was seeking equitable relief, rather than damages, the decision does
not conflict with DC Comics. 365
356. Id. at 1279 (citing Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 955 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1280.
359. See infra text accompanying notes 360-65 for a discussion of Amusement Sec. Corp. v.
Academy Pictures Distrib. Corp.
360. 294 N.Y.S. 279, 162 Misc. 608 (1936).
361. Id. at 294.
362. See infra text accompanying notes 379-83 for a discussion of Amusement Securities
Corp. v. Academy Pictures Distrib. Corp.
363. Amusement Sec. Corp. v. Academy Pictures Distrib. Corp., 294 N.Y.S 279 at 294, 162
Misc. 608 at 622.
364. Id.
365. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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2. The Ninth Circuit/California
In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 366 the California Court
of Appeal looked to an instance of actual confusion to support a claim
for likelihood of confusion, in order to grant the plaintiff relief. In Allied
Artists, damages were not at issue, but proof of actual confusion was used
to bolster the claim for equitable relief.3 67
Although the Ninth Circuit has not spoken to the issue of whether
actual confusion is required before damages are available, the other
courts are in accord concerning the element of actual confusion. When a
plaintiff seeks damages, a showing of actual confusion is required. In
contrast, if an equitable remedy is sought, a showing of likelihood of con-
sumer confusion will be enough to obtain relief.
B. Intent of Defendant-Misuse of Titles/Advertising
Another factor courts consider is a defendant's purpose for using a
particular title or advertising scheme. When a defendant chooses a title,
or markets his film, knowing that consumers are likely to be confused,
the courts may equate this knowledge with bad faith or misuse.3 68 When
a title is associated with a particular work, a defendant's subsequent use
of that title to capitalize on its prior successes, is evidence of defendant's
intent or misuse.
1. The Second Circuit/New York
In Orion Pictures Co. v. Dell Publishing Co., 369 the Second Circuit
focused on the defendant's bad faith as a means of determining relief. In
that case, the plaintiff decided to produce and distribute a film based
upon the popular European book "E=MC2, Mon Amour."3 7 During
production and pre-release, the motion picture, which was to be retitled
A Little Romance, received a lot of attention in the trade papers.371 Sub-
sequently, the defendant, who knew of the upcoming Orion film, ac-
quired the paperback publication rights to the book.372 Initial
negotiations regarding a proposed tie-in agreement between the film and
366. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 412-
18 for discussion of facts.
367. 368 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (1977).
368. HMH Pub. Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Fleishman Distil-
ling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 158 (9th Cir. 1963)).
369. 471 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
370. Id. at 393.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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the paperback fell through because the plaintiff felt that the screenplay
strayed considerably from the original book. Nonetheless, the defendant
chose not to use the novel's original title on the paperback version, but
instead used the plaintiff's title "A Little Romance," without the plain-
tiff's permission.373
The court found that the defendant published the paperback version
of the book to exploit the publicity and interest generated by the plain-
tiff's film. 374 Additionally, the defendant explicitly advertised its novel
as the same work as the plaintiff's film. The inscription on the book read
"NOW A MAJOR MOTION PICTURE. ' 375 Furthermore, the art on
the jacket of the paperback resembled the stars of the film. The court
found that a purchaser would assume that the book closely resembled the
film. 376 "The defendant's book, by virtue of its title and inscription, gives
the impression that it is the 'official' novel version of the film, and there-
fore highly similar in content to it."'3 77 By promoting that impression the
defendant increased the likelihood of confusion and misled the public.378
Likewise, the court in Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Pic-
tures Distributing Corp., 37' held that the presence of the word "Zombie"
in the defendants' title "Revolt of the Zombies" was likely to cause con-
fusion with the plaintiff's title "White Zombie." Additionally, the court
found defendants' advertising scheme was unconscionable. 3 ° The de-
fendants virtually reproduced the advertising material used for "White
Zombie." 38  Although the two films were not linked by their stories or
characters, the defendants' advertised their film as a "sequel" to "White
Zombie." 38 2 The court stated that the defendants, "under a colorable
imitation of plaintiff's title[,] will appropriate the good will inherent in
that name.
3 3
2. The Ninth Circuit/California
The Ninth Circuit also considers the defendant's intent to deceive
the public when evaluating the likelihood of confusion. 3 4 Although a
373. Id. at 394.
374. 471 F. Supp. at 396.
375. Orion, 471 F. Supp. at 394.
376. Id. at 397.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. 294 N.Y.S. 279, 162 Misc. 608 (1936).
380. Id. at 294-95, 162 Misc. at 622.
381. Id. at 295, 162 Misc. at 622.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 294, 162 Misc. at 622.
384. See HMH Pub. Co., Inc. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1974).
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plaintiff need not prove defendant's intent to mislead the public, to obtain
relief, "where such intent has been shown, the 'inference of likelihood of
confusion is readily drawn'. . . .85
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 386 the California court held
that the defendants' advertising slogan was likely to cause confusion with
the plaintiffs' film. The plaintiffs produced a film entitled The Wonderful
World of the Brothers Grimm, which was based on the lives of the
Grimm brothers, who are public domain characters. 38 7 The plaintiffs
publicized the title of their soon-to-be released film and chose their title
hoping to distinguish their film from other works derived from the same
source.
The defendants intended to release a film entitled Grimms Fairy
Tales, which was also based on the life of the Grimm brothers. To adver-
tise their film the defendants placed an ad in The Hollywood Reporter,
which read, "A WONDERFUL WORLD OF THE GRIMM BROTH-
ERS is depicted in Grimm Brothers 'GRIMMS FAIRY TALES'
.... "388 The court analogized defendants' misuse of advertising to the
misuse of titles and stated that "[u]se of another's advertising and public-
ity developments in a misleading manner is no less unfair than adopting a
title... which has come to be associated with its first user or his product
99389
The state and federal courts in New York and California agree that
when bad intent on the part of the defendant can be demonstrated, there
will be a greater likelihood of confusion. The courts are particularly sen-
sitive to a plaintiff's claim of likelihood of confusion, when a defendant
intentionally misleads the public. Through his deceit, defendant creates
a presumption of confusion.
C. Competing Markets and Media
Often the title of a film is borrowed from a work in another media,
for example, a song, book, or play. Early cases held that claims of unfair
competition could not be upheld in the face of non-competing mar-
kets.39' The rationale was that the general public would not be misled
into buying a movie ticket, simply because the movie had the same title
385. Id. at 720 (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149,
158 (9th Cir. 1963).
386. 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1963).
387. See infra text accompanying notes 495-519.
388. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 26, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
389. Id. at 30, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
390. Altas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 F. 398, 402 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755
(1913); Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 21, 143 N.E. 773, 778 (1924).
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as a book.3 9 ' However, the early decisions did not contemplate that the
public might go to see a movie because they believed it was based on a
book with the same title. 392 In response to this problem many courts
now grant protection to a motion picture title when it is based on a book
of the same title, against a competing motion picture with the same or a
similar title.3 93 In contrast, courts have been less apt to grant protection
for competing books.3 94 The rationale for the dichotomy in protection is
the belief that book buyers generally purchase books based on their au-
thors, not their titles.39 5
1. The Second Circuit/New York
The Second Circuit addressed the similarity of markets in Motown
Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc. 396 The court found that in non-com-
peting markets, the likelihood of confusion is diminished.3 9 7
In Brown v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 398 the plaintiffs, who owned the mo-
tion picture rights to their book "Sex and the Single Girl" sought to pre-
vent the defendants from using the title "Sex and the Single Man" for a
book or movie.3 99 The court enjoined the defendants from using their
title for a motion picture, but allowed them to retain it for the book.'
Plaintiffs argued that the public had become familiar with their book
and the emergence of a book or motion picture under defendants' title
would confuse the purchaser or moviegoer. 4" To determine likelihood
of public confusion, the court asked whether "the two titles [are] so simi-
lar that the public will be confused and thus defendants will reap the
benefit of plaintiffs' labor and large expenditures in advertising the book
and motion picture?"" 2 The court determined that the books were suffi-
ciently different to avoid public confusion. 1 3 However, the court did
391. E.L., Perry, Protecting Literary Titles, 12 NEW MATrER 1, 7 (1987) [hereinafter
Perry].
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Brown v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 249 N.Y.S.2d 370, 374, 42 Misc. 2d 909, 911 (1964).
395. Id. at 374, 42 Misc. 2d at 911, (citing S.P., LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, 738 (1938)).
396. 668 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 849 F.2d 781 (2nd Cir. 1988) (court heard issue of
sanctions imposed on counsel); See also infra note 438 for a discussion of Motown Prods., Inc.
v. Cacomm, Inc.
397. Motown, 668 F. Supp. 285 at 290-91.
398. 249 N.Y.S. 2d 370, 42 Misc. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
399. Id. at 372, 42 Misc. 2d at 910.
400. Id. at 374, 42 Misc. 2d at 912.
401. Id. at 372, 42 Misc. 2d at 910.
402. Id. at 373, 42 Misc. 2d at 911.
403. Brown, 249 N.Y.S. 2d at 373, 42 Misc. 2d at 911.
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enjoin the defendants from using their title for a motion picture. In mak-
ing that determination, the court took into account the amount of time
and money expended by the plaintiffs, for production and promotion of
its upcoming film.' Additionally, the court viewed the book purchaser
and moviegoer in a different light.
The cases decided in the United States indicate that the Courts
are more ready to protect titles of plays and motion picture
films under the law of unfair competition than titles of
books. . . . The reason for this is that deception is easier in
these cases, whereas in the case of books, stories, etc., the pub-
lic gives greater attention to the name of the author than to the
title of the work.
4 5
2. The Ninth Circuit/California
In Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions., "6 the court focused on the
dissimilarity of markets. In Tomlin, the plaintiff wrote and performed a
copyrighted song, entitled The Love Bug Will Bite You (If You Don't
Watch Out). " Plaintiff later entered into a standard contract with a
publisher, assigning his rights to the piece, in exchange for royalties."
A few years later, the defendant released a film entitled The Love Bug,
which featured a Volkswagen "bug" with human characteristics." 9 The
court found that the litigants were not engaged in the same or competing
businesses and that the plaintiff failed to present special circumstances
from which confusion would result.41° Additionally, the plaintiff failed
to establish evidence of the defendant's intent to mislead or confuse the
public.4 1'
In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 412 the court found the
defendant's movie title sufficiently similar to the plaintiff's movie title to
cause public confusion.4 13 The plaintiff acquired the distribution rights
to the French film Histoire d'O, which was based on the book of the same
title. The plaintiff released the film in the United States under the angli-
404. Id. at 374, 42 Misc. 2d at 912.
405. Id.
406. 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
407. Id. at 229, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 238, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
411. 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 238, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 125 (1971).
412. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
413. Id. at 136, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
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cized title The Story of 0. 414 In the same year, the defendant acquired
distribution rights to a low budget film entitled The Journey of 0. This
film was not based on the French book and the only similarity between
the two was the sexual motif and the name of the main character, "0. " "45
The plaintiff contended that viewers of the defendant's film would be
confused by the similar titles.4" 6 One instance of actual confusion oc-
curred where the trade paper, Daily Variety reported The Journey of O's
earnings as those of The Story of O's. 417 Although defendant's film, The
Journey of 0 was released first and was not based on the French book,
the trial court required the "defendant to take reasonable steps to dispel
the likelihood of confusion by including disclaimers in its advertising."4 '
Thus, public confusion may arise from the use of similar as well as identi-
cal titles. Although not explicitly stated in the court's opinion, the fact
that the similar titles were to be used in the same market probably
weighed heavily in favor of granting the plaintiff relief.
There are no Ninth Circuit cases which address competing markets
directly. However, it appears that the Ninth Circuit would agree with
the other courts that relief will usually be granted when works with iden-
tical titles are used in competing markets. Relief may also be granted
when similar titles are apt to cause confusion because the products are in
competing markets. Relief is less likely to be granted when the markets
are dissimilar, because the likelihood of confusion is reduced considera-
bly. However, if a plaintiff can show pecuniary damage because of de-
fendant's use of plaintiff's title, relief may be granted in non-competing
markets.4 1 9
D. Confusion as to Sponsorship
Confusion of sponsorship exists where the public knows that the
plaintiff did not manufacture the defendant's product, but, the public
may erroneously believe that the plaintiff sponsored the defendant's
product. In other words a consumer may be misled into believing that
the defendant's product is endorsed by the plaintiff. In these cases, the
confusion which may develop is based on confusion of sponsorship rather
than confusion of the source.420
414. Id. at 131, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 132, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
417. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 136, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99.
418. See infra text accompanying notes 629-35 for a discussion of disclaimers.
419. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
420. Perry, supra note 391.
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1. The Second Circuit/New York
In Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 421 the defendant's
use of the name "Wyatt Earp" in association with its play clothes created
a likelihood that the public would believe, erroneously, that its playsuits
were authorized by the plaintiff, the producer of the successful television
series entitled The Life and Legend of Wyatt Earp. 422 The program was
televised across the nation by the American Broadcasting Company.
423
The defendant manufactured children's play clothes, and at one time had
a license agreement with the plaintiff to use "the name and likeness of
Hugh O'Brian [the star of the series] in the characterization of Wyatt
Earp."424 Upon expiration of that agreement, the defendant continued to
manufacture its play clothes under the name of "Wyatt Earp.
' 425
Although defendant did not use O'Brian's name or likeness, the reference
to its product as the "official outfit" on the outfit's packaging implied
sponsorship by the plaintiff.
The court held that use of a name, even upon non-competing goods,
could be enjoined because consumer confusion as to sponsorship was es-
tablished.4 26 The court was also swayed by the fact that the plaintiff en-
tered into an agreement with another manufacturer to produce play
clothes on a royalty basis, and therefore any purchases which defendant
diverted from plaintiff's licensee had a direct pecuniary impact on
plaintiff.
4 27
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 428 the
plaintiff successfully enjoined a film company from distributing or exhib-
iting its X-rated motion picture Debbie Does Dallas, which depicted a
young woman in the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders uniform.429 The Sec-
ond Circuit held that likelihood of confusion was established because
anyone who saw the film could not disassociate it from the actual Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders. 430 This association would cause confusion as
well as injury to plaintiffs' reputation.431 "In order to be confused, a
consumer need not believe that the owner of the mark actually produced
421. 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
422. Id. at 625.
423. Id. at 623.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Wyatt Earp, 157 F. Supp. at 626.
427. Id.
428. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
429. Id. at 203.
430. Id. at 205.
431. Id.
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the item and placed it on the market. The public's belief that the [Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders] . . . sponsored or otherwise approved the use of
the trademark satisfies the confusion requirement.
4 32
2. The Ninth Circuit/California
In Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 433 the Ninth Cir-
cuit protected the plaintiff's trademark in the character "Tarzan" against
defendants' use of a substantially similar mark in the title of its motion
picture.434 The court found that defendants' use of the title "Tarz & Jane
& Boy & Cheeta" was likely to cause public confusion. In reaching that
conclusion the court looked to the following factors: (1) plaintiff and
defendants directed their advertising to the same class of the purchasing
public; 435 (2) the character "Tarz" was substantially similar to the char-
acter "Tarzan" contained in copyrighted works owned by plaintiff; (3)
the title of defendants' film contained a mark which was substantially
similar to the registered trademarks owned by plaintiff; (4) the value of
plaintiff's mark would be diluted since defendants' film was an X-rated
film over which plaintiff had no control; and finally (5) that the use of the
mark "Tarz" within defendants' film was likely to confuse viewers who
may believe the film is produced or authorized by plaintiff.
4 36
In both Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders437 and Edgar Rice Burroughs,
the court seemed to pay special attention to the plaintiff's reputation,
which would be damaged if the public believed that plaintiff sponsored
the X-rated film. Thus, both the Second and Ninth Circuits are more
likely to find confusion as to sponsorship when there is a possibility of
harm to the plaintiff's reputation.
E. Tests for Likelihood of Confusion
In addition to actual confusion, the intent of defendant, competing
markets, and confusion as to sponsorship the courts have applied specific
tests to determine whether there is a likelihood of public confusion.
These tests include the "Polaroid test" and the "reasonable person
standard."
432. Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted).
433. 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal, 1976).
434. Id. at 162.
435. In other words, the defendants' advertising targeted the same group of people to whom
plaintiff's advertising was directed.
436. Edgar Rice Burroughs, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 161.
437. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
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1. The Polaroid Test
In Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 438 the plaintiff, who
broadcast a television series entitled Nightlife sought a declaratory judg-
ment to determine that the defendant, who was broadcasting a cable pro-
gram entitled Nightlife, had no exclusive right to use of that title.439 The
court followed the test outlined in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics
Corp. 4'0 The "Polaroid test" consists of eight factors: (1) the weakness
of defendant's mark; (2) the dissimilarity of the marks as used; (3) bridg-
ing the gap; (4) actual confusion; (5) good faith of the second user; (6)
difference of quality in the products; (7) sophistication of the purchaser;
and (8) the balance of hardships of granting the relief sought versus de-
nying the relief.
Reviewing the eight elements, the Motown court found that use of
both titles would not cause public confusion." 1 The court found that the
defendant's mark was weak because the distribution of defendant's pro-
gram was limited. " 2 Moreover, there was no evidence that the public
ever associated the title "Nightlife" with defendant's show." 3
Under the second factor, the court found that the plaintiff had
widely used the title "Nightlife" with a distinctive logo, while defendant
had no logo.4 " The court also noted that the difference in media was a
significant factor.445 Defendant's program aired on a local cable station,
while plaintiff's program was broadcast coast to coast by major
networks.
44 6
The court found no merit in defendant's argument, under the third
factor, that it had always planned to carry its Nightlife into any available
market. 44 7 There was little likelihood that defendant would bridge the
gap by entering the market occupied by plaintiff. As a result, the liti-
gants were not in competing markets.44 As to the fourth factor, defend-
ant conceded that there were no incidents of actual confusion."49
The plaintiff produced evidence that a title search was done to see if
438. 668 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 849 F.2d 781 (2d Cir.
1988)(Court heard issue of sanctions imposed on counsel).
439. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 287.
440. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
441. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 290-92.
442. Id. at 290.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 290-91.
445. Id.
446. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 290-91.
447. Id. at 291.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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the title "Nightlife" was available. Additionally, the plaintiffs were ad-
vised by three attorneys that their proposed title was in the public do-
main.45° According to the court, this demonstration of good faith was an
important factor for plaintiff's case.4 '
The defendant did not dispute the fact that the plaintiff's product
was vastly superior to its own.452 Therefore, under the sixth factor, the
court found that defendant's reputation could not be tarnished by plain-
tiff's program.
4 53
Another factor considered under the "Polaroid test" is the sophisti-
cation of the targeted consumers.454 The court found that an unsophisti-
cated buyer would find it easy to distinguish plaintiff's expensive
program from defendant's low budget program, especially in light of the
fact that defendant's program was off the air for the thirteen months
prior to the premiere of the plaintiff's show.4 55
Finally, the court balanced the hardships and determined that the
scale weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiff, who had invested substan-
tial amounts of time and money to produce its program.456 The court
found that no concrete benefit would be conferred on the defendant if it
were granted exclusive use of the title "Nightlife," while the burden to
the plaintiff would be enormous.4 57 In sum, the court found that each of
the Polaroid factors negated the conclusion that prudent purchasers were
likely to be misled or confused as to the source of the programs.458
2. The Reasonable Person Standard
In Shaw v. Time-Life Records,459 the New York Court of Appeals
applied a reasonable person standard. The court stated that the test of
whether the public is confused as to identity is "whether persons exercis-
ing 'reasonable intelligence and discrimination' would be taken in by the
similarity. ' ' "6
In conclusion, courts look to a variety of factors, none of which are
determinative, to find likelihood of confusion. The courts rely on their
450. Id.
451. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 291.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 291-92.
455. Id.
456. Motown, 668 F. Supp. at 292.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. 38 N.Y.2d 201, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1975).
460. Id. at 206, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
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tailored versions of particular elements outlined in the Restatement of
Torts, for the starting point of their analyses. Evidence of actual confu-
sion will inevitably lead to a determination that the public is likely to be
confused, because there is proof that they have already been confused. If
a defendant exhibits a bad faith intention in its choice of a title, the
courts will follow defendant's lead. In other words, if a potential defend-
ant chooses a title in hopes of capitalizing on the success of plaintiff's
prior use of that title, the court will usually determine that defendant's
intention to mislead the public will suffice to show a likelihood of confu-
sion. When similar or identical titles are used in competing markets
rather than non-competing markets, the courts are more likely to grant
protection. If there is confusion as to sponsorship and the public is likely
to believe that the plaintiff sponsored defendant's work, the courts are
likely to provide plaintiff with relief. Confusion as to sponsorship is most
common when the product produced by the defendant will have a nega-
tive impact on the plaintiff's reputation, as in the case of pornographic
films.
There are no hard and fast rules which can be applied to guarantee
protection to a literary title. However, it is clear that the courts will
scrutinize the presence or absence of the above factors.
II. ABANDONMENT
Literary titles may be used under circumstances where they have
previously acquired a secondary meaning.46 A title may be associated
with a particular work at one point in time, and may subsequently lose
that association.462 Ongoing use of a title with a literary work establishes
the association between the title and the work in the public's mind and it
is this recognition that maintains the right in the "mark." '463 If the
strength of the mark is diluted by non-use or third party use, the result
may be abandonment.4" Abandonment is determined by a jury, based
on evidence as to whether the secondary meaning in a title ceased to
461. See Golenpaul v. Rosett, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889, 174 Misc. 114 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Curtis v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1956);
Kirkland v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 425 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Penn. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 152
(3d Cir. 1977).
462. Golenpaul v. Rosett, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 892, 174 Misc. at 114.
463. See Golenpaul v. Rosett, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889, 174 Misc. 116-17 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Curtis v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1956);
Kirkland v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 425 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Penn. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 152
(3d Cir. 1977).
464. See infra text accompanying notes 466-94.
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exist.465
A. Abandonment Through Non-Use and Intent Not to Resume Use
The use of the title as a "trademark" may be lost if it is not used for
an extended period of time, and the public no longer associates the title
with the work.466 "Abandonment of trade identity rights occurs when
nonuse is coupled with the absence of an intention to continue or resume
the use of a previously used name or mark. '4 67 When abandonment is
proved, the rights, once privately owned, will be forfeited to the public
domain.468
On the federal level, the Lanham Act4 69 provides that two years of
nonuse of a registered mark constitutes prima facie abandonment, but
this presumption can be rebutted merely by a convincing demonstration
of a state of mind to resume use.4 7 ° Conversely, where appropriate,
courts will imply intent to abandon through non-use of a title.47' Aban-
donment will be found "where an objective analysis of the situation fur-
nishes ample evidence to warrant the inference of abandonment." '472
If the right to exclusive use of a title could be upheld on subjective
intent alone, a claim of abandonment would be easily blocked. Further-
more, if a party could hold a monopoly on words, the world of literary
titles would be severely limited, a result never intended.473 If a title is no
longer associated in the minds of the public with a particular work and
subsequent use of that title would not cause public confusion, the ele-
ments which established the secondary meaning in the first place no
longer exist. When that is the case, abandonment may be confirmed re-
gardless of intent.
As early as 1940, in Golenpaul v. Rosett, 474 a New York court
looked beyond the subjective intent of the title user to find abandonment.
Defendants published two issues of a magazine entitled Information
Please,475 and then discontinued publication because of lack of funds.
465. Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 123-24, 222 P.2d 433, 438
(1950).
466. Kirkland, 425 F. Supp. at 1118.
467. B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS 120 (1987).
468. See infra text acompanying notes 495-519 on Public Domain.
469. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
470. Id.
471. American Photographic Pub. Co. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 135 F.2d 569, 573 (7th Cir.
1943).
472. Id. (citations omitted).
473. See Golenpaul v. Rosett, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 893, 174 Misc. at 117-18.
474. 18 N.Y.S.2d 889, 174 Misc. 114.
475. Id. at 891, 174 Misc. at 115-16.
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Subsequently, plaintiffs developed a radio program also entitled Informa-
tion Please.476 Defendants then sought to resume publication of their
magazine under the same name.477
The court found that even if secondary meaning was established at
one time, the defendants' right to the name had been abandoned.478 The
court believed that defendants were only able to resume publication be-
cause plaintiffs had given Information Please popularity sufficient to es-
tablish public recognition.
[W]hen the business itself actually ceases for such a length of
time and under such circumstances that the mark or name ac-
tually no longer signifies that business in the mind of the public
the right to the mark or name is lost, despite the existence of a
479purely subjective intent on the part of the user ....
Thus, it is not enough for a user to say that he intended to use the title
again if there has been a significant period of non-use.48°
In Kirkland v. National Broadcasting Co., 48' the plaintiff created a
story entitled "Land of the Lost,"482 which was originally broadcast as a
radio show. The success of the show generated a book, a record album,
cartoons, and comic books. The controversy in the case stemmed from
defendant's television program entitled Land of the Lost, which was not
televised until twenty years after plaintiff had used her title in the com-
mercial world. 483 The court found that even if plaintiff's work had a
secondary meaning at one point, the secondary meaning was lost during
the plaintiff's extended period of non-use. Furthermore, plaintiff's hope
of someday using the title again was not enough to prevent others from
utilizing it.484
Recently, in Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 485 the Second Circuit affirmed
the rule that abandonment could be found through non-use coupled with
an intent not to resume use. In Silverman, a playwright sought declara-
tory judgment that the Amos 'n Andy radio and television programs
were in the public domain, and therefore could be used in his Broadway
476. Id. at 890, 174 Misc. at 114.
477. Id. at 892, 174 Misc. at 117.
478. Id. at 893, 174 Misc. at 118.
479. Golenpaul, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 893, 174 Misc. at 118.
480. Id.
481. 425 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Penn. 1976).
482. Id.
483. Id. at 1118.
484. Id.
485. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).
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musical.4" 6 Finding that the marks had been abandoned, the court relied
on the fact that defendant had not used the "Amos 'n' Andy" marks for
twenty-one years.487 In accord with other courts, the Second Circuit in-
ferred intent not to resume use from actual non-use, regardless of defend-
ant's subjective intent.488
B. Third Party Use Destroying Secondary Meaning
The Restatement of Torts provides that a potential claimant whose
title has acquired a secondary meaning, but has not been in use, must
bring an action against an infringer, before the infringer's use of that title
also acquires a secondary meaning. If a producer fails to protect his
rights, they may be lost.4 9 Again, the subjective intent of the original
user is not dispositive.
In International Film Service Co. v. Associated Producers, Inc., 490
the plaintiff published a story entitled "Broken Doll" in Cosmopolitan
magazine. Fifteen years later, both the plaintiff and the defendant were
planning releases of films, both entitled Broken Doll. Finding for the
defendant, the court took into consideration the fact that plaintiff's story
was only published once, fifteen years earlier. Another important factor
was that the title was used two other times by third parties in that fifteen
year period.4 9 Judge Learned Hand held that the facts weighed heavily
against finding a secondary meaning, and that due to third party use, the
likelihood that the public associated "Broken Doll" specifically with
plaintiff's original story was slim. 492 Therefore, the public was not likely
to mistake one "Broken Doll" for the other.
Similarly, in Curtis v. Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp., '91 the
plaintiff published a book entitled "Hey Mac! You're in the Navy Now."
Subsequently, defendant released a movie entitled You're in the Navy
Now. The court found that the plaintiff had essentially abandoned his
title. The court emphasized the fact that prior to publication of the
plaintiff's book, several other works had used titles with similar
phrases.494
486. Id. at 43.
487. Id. at 46.
488. Id.
489. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 752 (1938).
490. 273 F. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
491. Id. at 587.
492. Id. at 588.
493. 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P.2d 62 (1956).
494. Paramount produced a film 18 years earlier entitled We're in the Navy Now (Para-
mount 1926). Id. at 466, 295 P.2d at 67.
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When third parties use a title in association with their work, and no
steps are taken by the putative owner to prevent that use, the secondary
meaning in the putative owner's title will be diluted, because in time, the
title will signify more than one work. Additionally, producers should be
aware of all infringing uses, not just the obvious copying of their titles. It
is the responsibility of the titleholder to take reasonable precautionary
steps to insure that he is not sleeping on his rights.
III. WORKS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
"A work can be in the public domain for copyright purposes if it
was published and was never federally copyrighted or if the original
copyright has expired with age."'495 It is assumed that the title of a liter-
ary piece is "descriptive" of the work.49 6 Therefore, courts reason that if
a public domain work can be copied, its title can also be used to describe
the work which has been copied.497 Courts hold that when a copyright
expires, the title descriptive of that work passes with it into the public
domain. 498 However, there is a caveat to use of titles in the public do-
main. If the title has acquired and maintained a secondary meaning, sub-
sequent users have a duty not to confuse the public.499 In Gotham Music
Service v. Denton & Haskins Music Publishing Co., " the court held that
"[in the absence of the use of the name in such a way as to create a
likelihood that people will be misled, the name is publici juris [of public
right], and may be used by all."5 °1
Likewise, the name and biography of a public figure is considered to
be in the public domain.5"2 In Osgood v. Allen, 503 the court stated that
"[b]y publishing.., a book under the title of the life of any distinguished
statesman, jurist or author, the publisher could not prevent any other
author from publishing an entirely different and original biography under
the same title.
' 5
0
4
Affirming that principle, the court, in Sherwood v. Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox Film Corp., 505 found that plaintiffs could not prevent defendant
495. J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10.12, at 356 (2d ed.
1984).
496. See supra text accompanying notes 172-82 for discussion of descriptive titles.
497. Id.
498. See G & C Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 237 U.S. 618, 628 (1915).
499. Id.
500. 259 N.Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57 (Ct. App. 1932).
501. Id. at 90, 181 N.E. at 58.
502. Osgood v. Allen, 18 F. Cas. 871 (C.C.D. Maine 1872).
503. Id.
504. Id. at 875.
505. 44 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
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from producing a motion picture depicting the same period and events of
Abraham Lincoln's life as those depicted by plaintiffs' play.50 6 The court
held that because the material belongs to the public domain,
no exclusive right to the use thereof can be acquired even
though [plaintiffs] were the first to discover its value as a me-
dium to awaken public interest. The use of such material is
absolute in the public and no one can exclude even though by
use thereof actual competition is incurred with the pioneer in
the particular realm of history or literature.50 7
The court stated that the plaintiffs could sustain a claim for unfair com-
petition only if they showed that defendant "by fraud and imposture
sought to mislead the public into believing that its motion picture was
based on [plaintiffs'] drama. "508
In Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, 509
the Second Circuit upheld the general rule that works in the public do-
main could not be granted exclusive use of a title. Although Walt Disney
had spent large sums of money advertising its film Alice in Wonderland,
the court held that it could not prevent the simultaneous release of an-
other motion picture under the same title.510 The court stated that "Al-
ice in Wonderland" is no longer subject to copyright and is as much in
the public domain as are Shakespeare's plays.5" Therefore, unless used
in a deceptive manner, a defendant will be permitted to use titles which
fall into the public domain.
In Brondfield v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 512 a New York court
held that although plaintiff's story-"That's My Boy"-was copy-
righted, that copyright did not protect the title.5" 3 The title "That's My
Boy," was held to be an expression belonging to the public domain,
therefore, plaintiff could not prevent defendant from using it. Further-
more, the title was used more than sixteen times before and after plain-
tiff's story was published." 4
The Ninth Circuit and California state courts are in accord. In
Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 515 the Ninth Circuit held that
506. Id. at 551.
507. Id. at 550.
508. Id. at 551.
509. 98 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1951).
510. Id. at 775.
511. Id.
512. 107 N.Y.S.2d 698, 200 Misc. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
513. Id. at 700, 200 Misc. at 885.
514. Id.
515. 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
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the right to use the name "Mark Twain" could not be granted to the
plaintiffs exclusively.516 The California Court of Appeal also held, in the
1977 case of Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 517 that a rela-
tive of Rudolph Valentino's could not stop defendants from portraying
the late Valentino's life under the title the Legend of Valentino: A Ro-
mantic Fiction 518 in their television movie. Because the life story of a
celebrity is in the public domain, the defendants were free to use the
title.519
Producers whose titles contain a property in the public domain
should adorn their titles with words which will serve to distinguish them.
Hopefully the titles will then be seen as descriptive and will be entitled to
legal protection.
IV. SUMMARY OF LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
When a producer can establish likelihood of consumer confusion be-
tween the use of his title and another's use of the same or similar title, he
may bring an action for unfair competition. If the title is not in the pub-
lic domain, and the original user has not abandoned his rights, the courts
will award remedies based on their jurisdictional requirements. The next
section discusses requirements for recovery in the context of litigation.
Cynthia B. Glasser
PART IV: ELEMENTS OF LITIGATION: EVIDENCE AND REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In an action for unfair use of a title, the plaintiff must present evi-
dence that the defendant wrongfully used his or her title. If the court
finds for the plaintiff, it will award an injunction and/or damages. The
plaintiff's burden of proof and the remedies available depend on the juris-
diction in which the case is brought.
516. Id. at 925.
517. 73 Cal. App. 3d 436, 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977).
518. Id. at 443, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
519. Id. at 441, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
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A. The Split Between The Jurisdictions
1. California
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 520 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 52 ("Sears-Compco"), the United States Supreme
Court held that states may not use unfair competition laws to protect
articles which Congress has left unprotected. 22 Some jurisdictions, in-
cluding California, interpret the Sears-Compco decisions as a limit on
states' power to prohibit copying of entertainment titles. 23 The rationale
behind this interpretation is that if Congress had intended to protect ti-
tles, then titles would have been specifically covered by copyright or
trademark laws.
524
Under California's interpretation of Sears-Compco, a plaintiff must
show three elements to state a cause of action for title infringement:
5 25
that the title has gained secondary meaning, that the defendant did not
take sufficient precautions to avoid confusion regarding the title, and that
he or she was actually harmed by the defendant's use of the title.5 26 In
other words, the mere copying of a title is insufficient to state a cause of
action in California.5 27 This means that a defendant may copy a title, as
long as he or she takes precautions to prevent consumer confusion re-
garding the titles.
5 28
2. New York
Other jurisdictions, including New York, have not interpreted
Sears-Compco as prohibiting state protection of titles. Therefore, these
jurisdictions allow a cause of action for mere copying of a title. 29 In
520. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
521. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
522. Anthony & Finkelstein, Protecting Against Unauthorized Use of Song Titles as Motion
Picture Titles 82 PAT. & TRADEMARK R. 145, 146 (1984) [hereinafter Anthony & Finkelstein].
523. Id. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 168
(1971); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 144, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1977).
524. Anthony & Finkelstein, supra note 522, at 146.
525. Id.
526. Id. See also, Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 168
(1971); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 144, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1977).
527. Anthony & Finkelstein, supra note 522, at 146.
528. Id. Confusion is best avoided by including a disclaimer with the title, stating that the
title is not to be confused with the plaintiff's title. For further discussion, see infra text ac-
companying notes 629-35.
529. Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
279, 301, 305-06 (1979) [hereinafter Angel].
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New York, proving secondary meaning is not a prerequisite, as long as
the infringement is shown to be unfair according to principles of eq-
uity. 3' Additionally, a New York plaintiff need not show that he or she
suffered actual harm resulting from defendant's use of the title.
B. Evidence To Be Presented
The evidence required in a title infringement action depends on the
jurisdiction and the scope of relief sought. To prove unfair use of a title,
the plaintiff must first show that he or she has rights to the title. These
rights are established by actual use and/or advertising of the title. 3 1
Next, most jurisdictions require that a plaintiff prove that the title gained
secondary meaning in the public mind,532 and that there was a likelihood
of public confusion over the plaintiff's and defendant's titles.533 Addi-
tionally, some courts require that the plaintiff show that he or she suf-
fered actual harm as a result of the defendant's use of the title.534 These
factors are most effectively proved through the use of witness testimony
and/or public surveys.
1. Proving Use, Secondary Meaning and Likelihood Of Confusion
a. Witness Testimony
Though courts permit testimony of the purchasing public, retailers,
salesmen and experts to establish whether a mark has gained secondary
meaning and/or to offer proof of likelihood of confusion, such extrinsic
evidence is seldom controlling. 35 In Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City
Brewing Co., 536 Premier-Pabst offered witness testimony to prove that
the defendant had infringed on Premier-Pabst's rights by adopting the
name "Olde Maestro Brew" as the name of its beer.537 In the past, Pre-
mier-Pabst had extensively used a celebrity known as "the Old Maestro"
to advertise its beer, and claimed the public now associated that name
with its beer. Their witnesses at trial were consumers who claimed to
530. National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974) (court stated that plaintiff need not prove secondary mean-
ing to be granted relief under New York law).
531. See generally supra text accompanying notes 226-37.
532. See supra text accompanying notes 149-342 for discussion of secondary meaning.
533. See supra text accompanying notes 343-519 for discussion of likelihood of confusion.
534. Anthony & Finkelstein, supra note 522, at 146 (citing Curtis v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P.2d 62 (1956) (All three elements are required in
California)).
535. Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935).
536. 9 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1935).
537. Id. at 756.
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have confused the plaintiff's and defendant's use of "Olde Maestro."
The court gave little weight to the testimony:
[S]uch testimony ... is evidence of slight weight, for the aver-
age individual is seldom a reliable interpreter of his own mental
reactions and content .... [T]he testimony of such witnesses,
especially if associated with either side, is particularly subject to
suggestion and bias. Not only that, but in view of the fact that
modem advertising reaches millions, the chancellor, though he
hear a hundred witnesses, can never know whether he has been
shown a representative picture.53
Courts usually require that the testifying witnesses be familiar with
the mark through personal experience. In Information Clearing House,
Inc. v. Find Magazine, "' the court's insightful analysis pointed out the
inadequacies of both parties' witnesses."4 Information Clearing House
("ICH"), an information retrieval service, attempted to establish that its
newsletter title "FINDOUT" had gained secondary meaning. ICH
called five witnesses, all of whom were its customers or competitors.
41
Two of the witnesses had never used ICH's services;542 two other wit-
nesses had extensively used ICH's information retrieval services, but
were not aware that the company published a newsletter called
"FINDOUT. ' 543 The fifth witness was familiar with ICH's publications,
but only alluded to one publication which was not "FINDOUT."
54 4
The defendants called two witnesses-their own circulation consultant
and their own advertising sales representative. The court found that all
of the witness testimony lacked probative value, because it was "result-
oriented . .. self-serving, [and] uninformed." '545 The court stated that
such "opinion testimony" was entitled to little weight.
546
Non-expert witnesses may be helpful in establishing that public con-
fusion has actually occurred regarding the plaintiff's and defendant's ti-
tles. The parties may present "confused-purchaser" testimony, as well as
evidence of misdirected complaints, mail and calls allegedly resulting
from the defendant's use of the title. For example, in Atlantic Monthly
538. Id. at 760.
539. 492 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
540. Id. at 160.
541. Id. at 157.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Information Clearing House, 492 F. Supp. at 157.
545. Id. at 161.
546. Id.
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Co. v. Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co., "^7 Atlantic Monthly presented a
letter from a college professor who confused Atlantic's name with de-
fendant's use of the name.548 Atlantic Monthly also showed that a col-
lege had attempted to place an incorrect order after confusing the
names.549 The court used this evidence in ruling that there was public
confusion.550
A party may also offer evidence of media errors resulting from con-
fusion over the plaintiff's and defendant's titles. In Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Friedman, "5 Allied Artists offered evidence that the trade pa-
per, Daily Variety, confused Allied's movie title with that of the defend-
ant.55  Calling the Daily Variety a "highly respected trade
publication," '553 the court used the error as evidence to establish that a
likelihood of confusion existed between the titles.
5 54
b. Surveys
A plaintiff should not rely solely on the testimony of witnesses to
establish secondary meaning and/or likelihood of confusion. An addi-
tional method of presenting this evidence is through the use of public
surveys. Properly conducted surveys may provide valid and persuasive
evidence of potential or actual consumer reactions.555 However, because
opposing counsel does not have the opportunity to cross-examine survey
respondents, nor to observe the respondents' demeanor and credibility,
surveys constitute hearsay evidence. 556 Nevertheless, Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 allows hearsay evidence in certain circumstances.557
Courts carefully scrutinize the trustworthiness and reliability of a
survey before allowing it into evidence. 558 There are certain criteria a
survey must meet. First, it must be conducted in the proper "universe,"
or that segment of the population whose characteristics are relevant to
the proposition in question. Also, the subjects of the survey must consti-
547. 197 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
548. Id. at 530.
549. Id. at 531.
550. Id. But cf Information Clearing House v. Find Magazine, 492 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (stating that a few misdirected telephone calls are not enough evidence to prove actual
confusion).
551. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
552. Id. at 136, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS 208 (1987).
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id.
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tute a fair and representative sample of that universe.5 59 For example, in
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products, 560 the court rejected the defendant's
survey for two reasons. First, the survey did not attempt to reach per-
sons who were in the market for the defendant's product, and a cause of
action for unfair competition requires that purchasers or prospective pur-
chasers be misled.5 61 Second, the survey failed to question people actu-
ally in the process of making a purchase. As the court explained: "If the
interviewee is not in a buying mood but is just in a friendly mood answer-
ing a pollster, his degree of attention is quite different from what it would
be had he his wallet in his hand." '5 62
Surveys must meet other judicial criteria as well. The questions in
the survey must be unbiased, as must the interviewers who actually do
the survey.563 To ensure unbiased interviewers, the interviewers must
not know who they represent. Additionally, the survey results must be
properly tabulated and interpreted by an expert.
II. REMEDIES
In an action for unfair use of a title, the remedy chosen depends on
the strength of the plaintiff's case565 and each particular court's interpre-
tation of unfair competition.5 66 In all jurisdictions, the remedies fall into
three basic categories: injunctive relief, disclaimer, and damages.
A. Injunctive Relief
In unfair competition actions regarding titles, damages often cannot
be measured and are not considered an adequate remedy at law.567 In
the absence of an adequate remedy, many courts will grant an injunction.
An injunction is a prohibitive, equitable remedy issued by a court which
559. Id.
560. 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
561. Id. at 308.
562. Id.
563. B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS 208 (1987).
564. Id. For further discussion of surveys, see generally American Luggage Works, Inc. v.
United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1957); The Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v.
Consolidated Distilled Prods., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984).
565. The strength of the plaintiff's case will depend on the evidence presented regarding
secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion and/or actual damages suffered. See supra text
accompanying notes 600-607.
566. For discussion of various interpretations of unfair competition, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 520-530.
567. See, e.g., Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858
(7th Cir. 1982) (damage to an entire licensing program and to a company's good will may not
be measured in monetary terms).
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forbids a defendant from doing some future act, or restrains the continu-
ance of some act already committed.568 If granted in an unfair competi-
tion case, an injunction may either prevent the defendant from any
further use of the plaintiff's title, or prohibit the defendant's use of the
title without a disclaimer.
69
Ordinarily, the terms of injunctive relief are tailored to the facts of
each case, and may include qualified requirements such as geographical
limitations.570 In a title infringement case, this would mean that the de-
fendant could use the title in other jurisdictions. However, because mo-
tion pictures and television shows are often shown nationwide,
geographical limitations on an entertainment title injunction would make
the injunction almost meaningless.571 In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Friedman, 572 the court held that a state court had authority to issue "an
injunction with extraterritorial impact,"5 73 as long as there was no evi-
dence that the action would conflict with the laws of any other jurisdic-
tion. That case involved two films, entitled The Story of 0 and The
Journey of 0, respectively. Because the films were both being promoted
and released throughout the United States, and not just in California, the
court concluded that the injunction issued against the distributors of The
Journey of 0 could apply nationwide.
5 74
Some courts will only grant a partial injunction against defendant's
use of the title.5 75  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court decisions in
Sears-Compco have shaped the doctrine of unfair competition relating to
titles in some jurisdictions. 576 Jurisdictions following the Sears-Compco
reasoning hold that because titles are not protected under the federal
trademark and copyright laws, a state may not create an "unfair compe-
tition" cause of action which would forbid the use of a particular title.
5 77
The effect of Sears-Compco on remedies in these jurisdictions, including
California, has been extreme.
568. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (5th ed. 1979).
569. For full explanation of disclaimers, see infra text accompanying notes 629-35.
570. B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS at 392-93.
571. Angel, supra note 529, at 301.
572. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
573. Id. at 137, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
574. Id. at 99. (The injunction issued in Allied did not prohibit defendant from using the
title, but required a disclaimer which would prevent public confusion regarding the two films.
Id. This is consistent with California's interpretation of Sears-Compco. See supra text accom-
panying notes 525-28).
575. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
576. See supra text accompanying notes 520-30.
577. Id.
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In the California case of Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions, 578 the
plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting Walt Disney from using The
Love Bug as a motion picture title.5 79 The court refused to grant the
injunction for several reasons, including a lack of secondary meaning in
the plaintiff's title.58° However, the court stated that even if there had
been secondary meaning, under its interpretation of Sears-Compco, relief
was limited "to a narrowly drawn injunction requiring [only] appropriate
precautions to prevent public confusion." 58' In other words, if a defend-
ant takes reasonable precautions to see that the public does not confuse
the defendant's work with the plaintiff's work of a same or similar title,
then the defendant will not be enjoined from using the title. The most
common way to prevent this confusion is to require a disclaimer in con-
junction with defendant's use of the title.
5 82
1. Granting A Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is an injunction granted at the institution
of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act.
5 83
In unfair competition actions regarding titles, a delay in granting plain-
tiff's injunction may result in a denial of justice, because it may be impos-
sible to undo the harm caused by defendant's use of the title in the
interim.58 4 If the plaintiff's case is strong,585 the court will grant the
preliminary injunction, which means that the defendant is prohibited
from using the title while the case is pending.
Because a preliminary injunction is such a drastic remedy, the plain-
tiff must make a substantial showing before it will be granted.58 6 In un-
fair competition actions, there are three factors which comprise a
substantial showing.58 7 First, the plaintiff must prove he may suffer ir-
reparable harm if relief is not immediately granted. Second, the plaintiff
578. 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
579. Id.
580. Id. at 238, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
581. Id. at 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
582. For a discussion of disclaimers, see infra text accompanying notes 629-35. See also,
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99-100
(1977) (defendant required to include disclaimer in advertisements of film with title similar to
plaintiff's).
583. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (5th ed. 1979).
584. See infra text accompanying notes 588-99 for discussion of irreparable harms.
585. The court will use certain factors when considering whether the plaintiff's case is a
strong one. See infra text accompanying notes 600-07.
586. Willpat Prods., Inc. v. Sigma III Corp., 227 F. Supp. 354, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
587. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Kusan, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 286 (1979) (citing
Kass v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 1977)).
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must show a high likelihood of success at trial. Finally, the court bal-
ances the equities in determining whether the hardships to the defendant
outweigh the benefits to the plaintiff, or vice versa.
a. Showing of Possible Irreparable Harm
In an action for unfair use of a title, a delay in granting relief may
result in a denial of justice, because irreparable harm may be caused by
the defendant's use of the title during the delay."' 8 An illustrative case of
how irreparable harm could result if relief is not immediately granted is
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc. "' Although the case is
not specifically concerned with a defendant's use of a plaintiff's title, the
potential harms are analogous to those which could result from use of a
title.
In Universal, Universal City Studios and Kamar owned all rights to
the "E.T." character and marketed an "E.T." doll.59 ° Defendant J.A.R.
began marketing a doll similar to the "E.T." doll already being marketed
by Kamar.591 The court issued a preliminary injunction against J.A.R.,
and cited lost sales, lost reputation and lost uniqueness of Kamar's mark
as potential results of J.A.R.'s actions. 92 The court also discussed irrep-
arable harm to plaintiff's marketing strategy, business relationships, good
will and public relations if relief was not immediately granted:
593
Universal will be hurt in its efforts to produce and distribute
future motion pictures if it is unable to fully protect its ...
rights. Merchandising will suffer serious damage to its reputa-
tion with potential licensees . . . . Kamar's relations with its
customers and sales representatives will be irreparably harmed
if Kamar is unable to protect itself against [similar inferior
products]. The plaintiffs' control over the quality and presenta-
tion..., will be destroyed, and the market thrown into confu-
sion by the potential flood of defendants' [products] .. .
Courts may also examine whether the plaintiff's lack of control over
the nature and quality of services that are likely to be associated with
plaintiff's mark would irreparably harm plaintiff's reputation and good
588. Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
589. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
590. Id. at 680.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 684.
593. Id. at 682-83.
594. Universal City Studios, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 682-83.
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will:595
The most corrosive and irreparable harm ... is the inability of
the victim to control the nature and quality of the defendant's
goods. Even if the infringer's products are of high quality, the
plaintiff can properly insist that its reputation should not be
imperiled by the acts of another.
596
For example, in WGBH Educational Foundation Inc. v. Penthouse
International Ltd., the defendant publishing company sought to use
the science television show title "Nova" as the title of its new magazine.
The court granted the preliminary injunction because the intended audi-
ence of the magazine was the same audience which read "girlie"
magazines.591 The court reasoned that this posed "a threat to plaintiff's
image of integrity and seriousness, and there [was] sufficient basis for
plaintiff to be concerned that its Nova operation may lose both its fund-
ing and its audience.v
599
b. Plaintiff Shows High Likelihood of Success at Trial
A court will grant a preliminary injunction at the time the action is
filed if the court believes that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the mer-
its.' In cases of unfair competition regarding titles, the plaintiff should
present evidence showing that his or her title has gained secondary mean-
ing and that there is a likelihood of confusion between defendant's and
plaintiff's titles.6° ' The stronger this evidence, the more likely the court
is to believe that the plaintiff will prevail; hence, the court is more likely
to grant the preliminary injunction.
Even if the plaintiff cannot prove success at trial, a court may still
grant the preliminary injunction if there are "sufficently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation [plus] a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the [plaintiff] ..... ", In
595. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 852,
859 (N.D. Il1. 1980); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
596. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir.
1982) (quoting 4 R. CALMANN UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 88.3(b) at 205 (3d ed. 1970)).
597. 453 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
598. Id. at 1352.
599. Id.
600. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981).
601. For discussion on the factors needed to prove secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion, see supra text accompanying notes 217-25 and 350-53.
602. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc. 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Jackson
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Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 603 Gay Toys began manufactur-
ing a toy automobile similar to the automobile in Warner Bros.' success-
ful Dukes of Hazzard T.V. series.' °  Although it was questionable
whether Warner Bros. would actually prevail at trial, the court awarded
Warner Bros. a preliminary injunction." 5 The court found "sufficient
grounds for litigation" since the defendant specifically attempted to ex-
ploit the market created by Warner Bros.6° 6 Additionally, a balance of
the hardships showed that if the relief were not granted, Warner Bros.
would suffer substantial lost sales and damage to its licensing program.60'
In summary, the court issued the preliminary injunction without requir-
ing Warner Bros. to show that they were likely to prevail on the merits at
trial.
c. Balancing of Hardships: Should The Preliminary
Injunction Be Granted?
Courts balance the potential hardships to the plaintiff and defendant
when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. If a court
concludes that by granting relief, the hardship on one party would
strongly outweigh the hardships to the other party, then the preliminary
injunction will not be granted.
60 8
The hardships and benefits are often measured by the financial ef-
fects on the parties. This may include potential lost profits and sales, or
the loss of resources already expended in costs and advertising. In
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee,' 9 the court found that an inequitable
financial burden would result if the defendant was allowed to use part of
plaintiff's title in its advertising. In that case, MGM intended to release
a film entitled The Wonderful World Of The Brothers Grimm, and the
defendant intended to release a film entitled Grimms Fairy Tales. MGM
Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979)). For discussion of "balance of
hardships," see infra text accompanying notes 608-16.
603. 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
604. Id. at 77.
605. Id. at 80.
606. Id. at 78-79.
607. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 608-16 for discussion of the balance of the hard-
ships in Warner.
608. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 31, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838
(1963) (the court's discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction "is based upon a balancing of
the respective interests of the parties with the objective of preventing injustice pending trial");
Willpat Prods., Inc. v. Sigma III Corp., 227 F. Supp. 354, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (court
denied plaintiff's preliminary injunction after weighing equities and finding that harm to de-
fendant through disruption of defendant's distribution arrangements would be greater than
benefit to plaintiff if injunction granted).
609. 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1963).
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widely publicized its title, and the defendant subsequently adopted the
phrase "wonderful world" into its own advertising slogan. The court
enjoined the defendant from using the phrase, finding that the potential
diversion of trade from MGM's film to defendant's film resulted in an
inequitable hardship to MGM and benefit to the defendant.61°
Other costs considered in balancing the equities are those already
spent by the parties in costs and advertising. For example, in Walt Dis-
ney Productions v. Kusan, 611 the defendant marketed a game called
"Black Hole In Space" simultaneous with Walt Disney's release of a mo-
tion picture entitled The Black Hole. Although the court was "not insen-
sitive to the tremendous burden that a[n]... injunction of any marketing
of 'Black Hole In Space' would place on defendant, ' 612 it compared the
huge marketing costs already expended by Walt Disney with the small
amounts spent on advertising by the defendant. Finding Walt Disney's
financial burden surpassed that of the defendant's, the court enjoined the
defendant from further use of the title for its game.613
Courts also take into account the intent of the defendant when bal-
ancing the hardships. The court in Walt Disney found clear evidence that
the defendant had intentionally traded on Walt Disney's goodwill and
business reputation.61 4 Consequently, it disregarded the defendant's
complaints as "hollow whimpers, '615 and ruled that since the defendant
could have avoided the hardships, the hardships were to be weighed in
Walt Disney's favor.616
In conclusion, a preliminary injunction will usually be granted only
if the plaintiff shows irreparable harm, a high likelihood of success at
trial, and a balance of the hardships in his or her favor. Courts often
take into account such factors as financial burdens on the parties and the
bad faith of the defendant when balancing the hardships.
2. Permanent Injunction
A permanent injunction often replaces the previously granted pre-
liminary injunction at the conclusion of the trial. Although the courts
have not articulated a common test for granting a permanent injunction,
610. Id. at 29, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
611. 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
612. Id. at 288.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Wilipat Prods., Inc. v. Sigma III Corp., 227 F. Supp. 354, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citing
McGraw-Hill Cook Co. v. Random House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 710, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646, 653
(1962)).
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courts focus primarily on the strength of plaintiff's case regarding the
same factors required for a preliminary injunction.6" 7 These factors in-
clude plaintiff's showing of irreparable harm and the relative hardships
to the parties if the injunction is not granted. Courts are most likely to
award a permanent injunction in cases where the plaintiff presents evi-
dence of the defendant's intent to capitalize on the plaintiff's reputation
and goodwill.618
Brandon v. Regents of the University of California 6 9 illustrates how
a defendant's intent may persuade a court to issue a permanent injunc-
tion. In Brandon, the plaintiff produced a successful educational film
entitled Anything You Want To Be. 620 The University of California
wanted to purchase a copy of the film, but the plaintiff refused because
the University intended to use the film for rental purposes. The Univer-
sity then produced a similar film and entitled it Anything They Want To
Be. 621 At trial, the plaintiff showed that the University was aware of,
and had attempted to purchase, plaintiff's film before producing its own
film. 6 2 2 Calling the University's action "a brazen act of outright plagia-
rism ' 623 and "deliberate pirating of plaintiff's property, "624 the court is-
sued a permanent injunction against the University's distribution of the
film, and required the University to direct potential customers to the
plaintiff.
62 5
Once a permanent injunction is issued, the defendant has an in-
creased duty not to infringe on the plaintiff's title. For example, in Au-
rora Products Corp. v. Schisgall Enterprises, Inc., 626 Aurora was the
licensee of ABC's title "Monday Night Football." The defendant toy
manufacturer attempted to use "Monday Night Football" as the name of
its new game, but was enjoined from doing so. Defendant then at-
617. For discussion of factors needed for a preliminary injunction, see supra, text accompa-
nying notes 586-616.
618. For examples of cases where plaintiff presented evidence of defendant's bad faith and
was awarded a permanent injunction, see Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Publishing
Co., 197 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (defendant enjoined from using any form of the title
"Atlantic" in its books); Esquire, Inc. v. Maira, 101 F. Supp. 398 (M.D. Pa. 1951) (injunction
issued against clothing manufacturer using "Esquire," after he deliberately chose the name
with knowledge of Esquire magazine's reputation).
619. 441 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Mass. 1977).
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 1089 (plaintiff produced purchase orders from the University requesting copies
of the film at trial).
623. Id.
624. Brandon, 441 F. Supp. at 1091 (D. Mass. 1977).
625. Id.
626. 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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tempted to adopt the name "SEI Night-Time Football" for the game.
The court prohibited any variation on "night-time football," stating that
there was no evidence of any other night-time broadcast of football other
than ABC's Monday Night Football.627 The court also explained that
"one who.., has been enjoined by the court from use of the infringing
mark must thereafter 'keep a safe distance' and will be held to a higher
standard of conduct with respect to the adoption of a new mark than
would have been applied in the first instance.,
628
Thus, as a result of a permanent injunction, the defendant's use of a
similar title will be prohibited, even though the similar title could have
been used prior to the original infringement.
B. Disclaimer
In some cases, justice is more properly served by requiring the de-
fendant to include a disclaimer whenever he or she uses a title similar to
plaintiff's. 629 Through the disclaimer, the defendant disavows any asso-
ciation with the plaintiff's work of a same or similar title.630 Disclaimers
are especially significant in California and other jurisdictions which in-
terpret Sears-Compco as preempting states from protecting titles which
are not protected under federal laws.631 In these jurisdictions, the goal is
not to insure that a title is used by only one party, but to avoid public
confusion over which title is to be associated with which party: "The
mere use of a substantially similar title, if not used in a manner to induce
the public to believe that the work to which it is applied is the identical
thing which it originally designated, does not constitute unfair
competition. 
632
The court may set explicit guidelines for the defendant's disclaimer.
In Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 633 the de-
fendant wanted to produce a talking motion picture entitled Gold Diggers
of Paris. Warner Bros. had already produced a silent motion picture en-
titled The Gold Diggers, and the court ordered the defendant to include a
disclaimer in conjunction with its use of the title.634 In ordering the dis-
627. Id. at 188.
628. Id. (citations omitted).
629. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971);
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
630. Disclaimers are usually used in promotions and advertising where the title appears.
631. For discussion of Sears-Compco, see supra text accompanying notes 520-30.
632. Curtis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 469, 295 P.2d 62,
67 (1956).
633. 70 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1934).
634. Id. at 312.
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claimer, the court explicitly required that: 1) the disclaimer be placed on
every piece of advertising and on the motion picture itself, 2) the words
be in type as large as the title itself, and 3) the words explicitly designate
the film as a "production of Majestic Pictures Corporation, not based on
Avery Hopwood's play or on the motion picture of Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc."
6 35
In summary, a disclaimer is ordered by the court to prevent confu-
sion over the plaintiff's and defendant's use of a same or similar title.
The disclaimer will be added to advertising and any other place that the
title is used. Courts will sometimes specify exactly what the disclaimer
should say, as well as the size and location of the words.
C. Damages
Some courts award damages in addition to, or in place of, injunctive
relief.6 36 If the plaintiff proves the defendant's use of a same or similar
title has destroyed or decreased the value of the plaintiff's work, damages
may be assessed.637 Courts usually consider the defendant's bad faith
when awarding damages,638 and some jurisdictions, including California,
require a showing of fraud to establish a damages claim.63 9 In other
words, to be awarded damages, the plaintiff must prove that the defend-
ant intended to deceive the public as to the source of the work."
In the California case of Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions, 641 the
court ruled that a plaintiff's damages claim must be specially pleaded
and proved. The court articulated three requirements which must be
met.642 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the title gained
secondary meaning.643 Second, the plaintiff must show that the defend-
635. Id.
636. However, many courts rule that damages in unfair competition cases are impossible to
measure, and will award injunctive relief only. See, e.g., Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982) (damages are "by their very nature irrepa-
rable and not susceptible of adequate measurement for remedy at law" (citations omitted)).
637. Angel, supra note 529. See also Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg.
Co., 349 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966) (damages are assessed
subject to principles of equity).
638. See, e.g., Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966); Brandon v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 441 F. Supp.
1086 (D. Mass. 1977).
639. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226,96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971);
Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1969).
640. Anthony & Finkelstein, supra note 522.
641. 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
642. Id. at 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
643. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 149-342 for discussion of proving secon-
dary meaning.
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ant failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent public confusion re-
garding the mark.6 " Third, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
actually intended to deceive the public.6  This intent factor is necessary
because damages merely for copying are unconstitutional under Califor-
nia's interpretation of Sears-Compco. 646 Once the court determines that
damages are an appropriate award in a particular unfair competition
case, there are three possibilities of recovery-defendant's profits, actual
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and costs of the action.
1. Defendant's Profits
If the plaintiff prevails, the court may award him or her an account-
ing. An accounting entitles the plaintiff to recover all or part of the de-
fendant's profits which resulted from the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
title.64 In the case of a motion picture title, this means that the plaintiff
could recover the defendant's gross income derived from sales and rent-
als of the infringing film.648
Courts award accountings on the basis that the public interest is
served by deterring fraudulent sales practices.649 In Brandon v. Regents
of the University of California ("Brandon ,,),6so the University of Califor-
nia deliberately pirated the title and subject matter of the plaintiff's film
after plaintiff refused to sell a copy of the film to the University. At trial,
the plaintiff presented evidence that the rentals, sales, and income from
her film decreased substantially after the University began marketing the
similar film.65' The court found that the decrease "was the direct result
of defendant's production and distribution of [the similar film]," 65 2 and
awarded the plaintiff an accounting and damages.653 The University
could have deducted its expenses from the amount awarded; however,
the burden of proving these costs is on the defendant, and the University
did not present evidence of its expenses at trial.654
Because of the difficulty in determining an equitable amount, courts
usually award accountings only in extreme cases such as Brandon, where
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. For discussion of Sears-Compco, see supra text accompanying notes 520-28.
647. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 18 (5th ed. 1979).
648. See, e.g., Brandon v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 441 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Mass. 1977).
649. Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 397 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
650. 441 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Mass. 1977).
651. Id. at 1090.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Id.
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the defendant deliberately used the plaintiff's title to capitalize on the
plaintiff's goodwill and reputation. As explained by one court: "[P]roof
of damages in these kinds of cases is extremely difficult because . . . it
requires an estimation of profits that did not come to fruition." '655 If
awarded, the amount of the accounting is based on the amount of profit
that the court decides would have been earned by the plaintiff had the
defendant not used the title. This amount is ascertained by the profits
actually earned by the defendant, minus expenses.656
2. Actual Damages Sustained By Plaintiff
In a minority of jurisdictions, courts award damages proportional to
the diminished value of the plaintiff's work resulting from the defend-
ant's use of the plaintiff's title.657 In other words, the plaintiff is awarded
the value of his or her work prior to the wrongful conduct of the defend-
ant less the value of plaintiff's work after the wrongful conduct of the
defendant.65 ' However, the majority view is that diminished value dam-
ages defy monetary measurement.659 In the minority are courts which
attempt to measure these damages based on a "trade diverted" theory. 6 °
In unfair competition cases regarding motion picture titles, this trans-
lates into the business diverted from the plaintiff's picture as a result of
the defendant's use of the plaintiff's title. Such diversion of trade may
occur because the audience is unaware that there are two separate films
with the same title. This unawareness may potentially keep the public
from seeing plaintiff's film.
In Paramore v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 661 the plaintiff authored a liter-
ary production entitled "The Ballad of Yukon Jake,' , 662 which he in-
tended to make into a motion picture. The defendant then produced and
distributed a motion picture entitled Yukon Jake. The court decided that
the defendant's film affected the marketability of the plaintiff's film, and
awarded damages because "there would no longer be the same demand
655. DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
656. Brandon v. the Regents of Univ. of Cal., 441 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (D. Mass. 1977)
(defendant must prove any expenses to be charged against its gross income).
657. See Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 391-93 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
658. Angel, supra note 529, at 301.
659. See, e.g., Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858
(7th Cir. 1982), DC Comics, Inc., v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1282 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
660. Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 391-93 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
661. 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal. 1925).
662. Id. at 67.
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for a second picture under [the] title ... and the marketability of plain-
tiff's [picture] would thus be proportionately destroyed.
663
Damages are awarded where injury has already occurred, and not in
cases of mere possibility of injury. 66" As explained by one court, dam-
ages are "merely a means of protecting a businessman from injury result-
ing from another's use of his [title]. 665 In other words, the damages
amount is a measure of the plaintiff's injury, not of the defendant's
enrichment.
3. Costs Of The Action
Usually, attorneys' fees are not awarded in unfair competition
cases. 6 6 6 However, a court might award costs based on the strength of
plaintiff's case, and a showing of bad faith on the part of the defend-
ant. 667 In Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Manufacturing
Co., 668 the court found that the defendant "deliberately infringed" upon
the plaintiff's mark by selling inferior products falsely labelled with
plaintiff's mark. 669 The court upheld an award for legal fees and re-
manded the case for a determination of damages, stating that "a judg-
ment limited to an injunction is clearly inadequate to deter those who
deliberately engage in commercial piracy which defrauds thousands of
consumers and injures a trade name built up at considerable cost by legit-
imate means."
67 0
In conclusion, accountings, damages and/or costs are usually
awarded only when the plaintiff suffers actual harm as a result of the
defendant's use of his or her title. These awards are most often based on
the bad faith of the defendant, and the defendant's intent to deliberately
capitalize on the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff.
D. Other Possible Remedies
Occasionally courts choose some other remedy in conjunction with
663. Id. at 68.
664. Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966) ("Injunctive relief may be warranted by the mere
possibility of... injury, but a monetary award, whether in the form of damages or an account-
ing, is justified only to the extent that injury is shown already to have been suffered.").
665. Id.
666. HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 1974).
667. See, e.g., Brandon v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 441 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Mass.
1977); Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
668. 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965).
669. Id. at 390.
670. Id. at 397.
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injunctive relief, disclaimers and/or damages. For example, if one party
registers a title, and that title is later found to infringe on another party's
title, the court will require that the registration be withdrawn.67" ' An-
other option is to actually recall the product associated with the title,
although this remedy is rarely required because of the extreme hardship
it places on the defendant.672 Also, as seen in Brandon v. Regents of the
University of California, 673 the court may require the defendant to direct
future business relating to the title back to the plaintiff, especially if the
defendant intended in bad faith to divert business from the plaintiff.674
III. PROTECTING ONESELF
A. Title Registration
A title may be registered as a federal trademark or copyright. How-
ever, courts do not decide title infringement cases on the basis of a title's
registration. Rather, the court uses federal registration as prima facie
evidence that the party did, in fact, use the title.675
It is also possible to register a title with the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America ("MPAA"). 6 76 This means that all MPAA members
receive notice when a title is being used, and may contest the usage
through arbitration proceedings. Although this is an effective way to
give notice of title usage, courts use MPAA registration as mere prima
facie evidence in deciding title infringement cases.
B. Title Availability Report
Once a producer decides on a potential title, it is advisable to check
the title for prior usage. Because registration of titles is not required, a
search of registered trademark or copyrighted titles is inadequate. One
alternative is to employ a title search company. These companies are
equipped with both federal copyright and trademark records, and their
own databases which contain records of non-registered titles. These
records are compiled largely from the entertainment trade papers, espe-
671. Dollcraft Co. v. Nancy Ann Storybook Dolls, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 1, 4-6 (S.D. Cal. 1950),
aff'd, 197 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952) (registration merely raises
rebuttable presumption over whether mark is protected; court ordered registrations cancelled).
672. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Kusan, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284 (1979) (court
did not require defendant to recall 73,000 games using plaintiff's title, especially since packag-
ing was likely to be thrown away).
673. 441 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Mass. 1977).
674. 1d. (Court directed defendant to give notice of plaintiff's film in all of its catalogues
and in response to all inquiries about the film).
675. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
676. For discussion of MPAA registration, see supra text accompanying notes 120-38.
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cially The Hollywood Reporter, Weekly Variety and Daily Variety. When
a new title is mentioned in one of these papers, the companies add it to
their database.677
A title report consists of a listing of all prior uses of a particular or
similar title in the literary, motion picture, radio, television, music and
trademark fields. Once the producer has received this information, it
must be interpreted to see if the title may be legally used.67 s This de-
pends on that particular jurisdiction's interpretation of secondary mean-
ing and likelihood of confusion.679 Usually the price of a title search is
under $500.00.680 The price varies, depending on the producer's need
and any special requests, like foreign language searches.
C. Insurance
Distributors, television networks and financiers will often insist that
a producer obtain producer's liability insurance for each production.
This insurance is known as "Errors and Omissions Insurance" or "E & 0
Insurance." It may include protection against copyright infringement,
defamation, invasion of privacy, misappropriation of right of publicity
and title infringement.68
It is difficult to specifically isolate the cost of title infringement pro-
tection because it is purchased as part of the E & 0 Insurance pack-
age.682 However, an insurance company may refuse to insure a specific
part of the production, including the title.683 In this case, the producer
must go to another insurer, assume the liability, or modify the produc-
tion so the insurance company will insure it.
681
Martha M. Early
677. Two major title availability services are Dennis Angel and Thomson and Thomson.
Dennis Angel, 33 Lynwood Road, Scarsdale, New York, 10583 (914) 472-0820, or Robert
Angel, 314 East Capitol Suite 503, Washington, D.C., 20003 (202) 547-6370. Thomson &
Thomson, 500 Victory Road, North Quincy, MA, 02171 (800) 356-8630.
678. In the case of Dennis Angel, it is also possible to request that the report be accompa-
nied by a legal opinion on the title's availability.
679. See supra text accompanying notes 520-30 for discussion of courts' interpretations of
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.
680. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles (Oct., 1989).
681. Id.
682. Id
683. Id.
684. The four major companies which offer E&O Insurance are Fireman's Fund, Chubb/
Pacific Indemnity, Transamerica and Lloyd's of London. In order to insure a title, these com-
panies require a title availability report from a reputable company. See supra text accompany-
ing note 677.
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PART V: CONCLUSION
Single literary titles are protected under state unfair competition
doctrines and section 43(a) of the federal Lanham Act. The protection
afforded, however, differs drastically depending upon the jurisdiction in
which the case is heard.
California offers a plaintiff only one cause of action-the passing-off
theory. In order to receive this protection, the plaintiff must establish
secondary meaning. The prevailing plaintiff, however, is left with the
unsatisfactory knowledge that the defendant may still be permitted to use
the same or similar title as long as the defendant includes a disclaimer.
Plaintiffs in New York state courts, on the other hand, may avail them-
selves of the passing-off theory, the misappropriation doctrine, and an
anti-dilution statute. While secondary meaning may assist plaintiffs in
proving their claims in New York, they are not required to prove it.
Section 43(a) of the federal Lanham Act is not uniformly applied.
State courts have construed the Lanham Act in a manner consistent with
their respective attitudes towards title protection. Federal courts in Cali-
fornia read a secondary meaning requirement into section 43(a),
although this requirement is not explicitly stated in the language of the
statute. Federal courts in New York appear to follow New York state
courts' liberal bestowal of protection for titles in their interpretation of
section 43(a).
To protect a single literary title in most jurisdictions, a producer
must prove that his or her title has acquired secondary meaning.
Although secondary meaning is not a requirement in New York, it still
plays a prominent role in an unfair competition cause of action. To show
secondary meaning, the producer must prove that, in the minds of a sub-
stantial number of people, the title has become associated with a single
source. The general factors that the courts consider in determining
whether a title has acquired secondary meaning are: (1) the advertising
expenditures of the claimant, (2) consumer studies linking the name to its
source, (3) the sales success of the work, (4) unsolicited media coverage,
(5) the defendant's attempt to plagiarize the plaintiff's mark, and (6) the
length and exclusivity of the use by the plaintiff.
Most jurisdictions also require a plaintiff to prove a likelihood of
confusion between plaintiff's title and defendant's title. If it is difficult
for the public to distinguish two works because of similarity of their ti-
tles, a claim for unfair competition may be on the horizon. The remedies
available to the plaintiff depend on the strength of his or her claim.
If the plaintiff proves that actual confusion does exist, then likeli-
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hood of confusion is established and damages may be available. When a
plaintiff can show bad faith on the part of the defendant, the courts seem
more willing to recognize likelihood of public confusion. Likewise, if a
plaintiff can show that the public is likely to believe that he or she spon-
sored defendant's work, there is likelihood of confusion. A claim for
likelihood of confusion in competing and non-competing markets is not
as clear-cut. When the markets are in direct competition the courts are
more apt to help the plaintiff. However, other factors, such as pecuniary
interests, may weigh in favor of granting plaintiff the relief requested,
even in non-competing markets.
Most entertainment title infringement cases are litigated in New
York and California, but, as stated supra, the two jurisdictions have a
suprisingly different attitude toward protecting entertainment titles. An
analysis of recent decisions may help a party decide what elements to
present to the court. However, one should realize that the outcome of a
title infringement case will depend largely on what factors each particu-
lar court chooses to emphasize.
Whitney Hartford Conant, Lisa E. Socransky,
Cynthia B. Glasser and Martha M. Early
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